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UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
O F WHY SARBANES-OXLEY WHISTLEBLOWERS
RARELY WIN

Scholars praise the whistleblower protections of the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 as one of the most protective anti-retaliation
provisions i n the world. Yet, during its first three years, only 3.6% of
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won relief through the initial
administrative process that adjudicates such claims, and only 6.5%
of whistleblowers won appeals through the process. This Article
reports the results of a n empirical study of all Department of Labor
Sarbanes-Oxley determinations during this time, consisting of over
700 separate decisions from administrative investigations and
hearings. The results of this detailed analysis demonstrate that
administrative decision makers strictly construed, and i n some cases
misapplied, Sarbanes-Oxley's substantive protections to the
significant disadvantage of employees. These data-based findings
assist i n identifying the provisions and procedures of the Act that do
not work as Congress intended and suggest potential remedies for
these statutory and administrative deficiencies.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; J.D., magna cum
laude, 1998, Harvard Law School. I give special thanks to Lynne M. Webb, Professor of
Communication, University of Arkansas, whose methodological insight and advice proved
invaluable. I also truly appreciate the helpful comments from Cynthia Estlund, Susan
Franck, Jarod Gonzalez, Pauline Kim, Colleen Medill, Robert Moberly, Mike Pitts, Geoffrey
Rapp, Ryan Sevcik, Charles Sullivan, Robert Vaughn, Steve Willborn, and the participants
a t the First Annual Colloquium on Current Scholarship in Labor and Employment Law a t
Marquette University Law School. I owe significant thanks to Nilgun Tolek, the Director of
OSHA's Office of Investigative Assistance, who handled my Freedom of Information Act
requests (and many follow-up questions and requests) with candor and integrity. May all
government employees be as responsive to the public as Ms. Tolek. My research assistants,
Brad Sipp, Cindy Laub, and Scott Newman, deserve special mention because of their focus
and patience during the coding of over 700 case files. A McCollum Research Grant provided
support for the research and writing of this Article.
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UNFVLFILLED EXPECTATIONS

Whistleblowers played a significant role in revealing and
disrupting corporate malfeasance a t the beginning of the twentyfirst century, a s scandals a t corporations such a s Enron and
WorldCom came to public light through the efforts of whistleblowing
employees.' Subsequently, Congress recognized the importance of
whistleblowing and included strong and unprecedented antiretaliation protection for corporate employees a s part of the
Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002 ("the Act"), the mammoth congressional
reaction to these corporate scandal^.^
Yet, in the first three years after the statute's enactment, the
Act failed to protect the vast majority of employees who filed
Sarbanes-Oxleyretaliation claims. During this time, 491 employees
filed Sarbanes-Oxley complaints with the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), the agency charged with initially
investigating such complaint^.^ OSHA resolved 361 of these cases
and found for employees only 13 times, a win rate of 3.6%.4 On
appeal from 93 OSHA decisions, administrative law judges (ALJs)
in the Department of Labor found in favor of 6 employees, a win
rate of 6.5%.5
This Article presents the findings of a n empirical analysis of
these Sarbanes-Oxley administrative decisions to explore why the
Act's protections did not produce a robust number of employee
victories. The results indicate that employees rarely won claims for
two primary reasons. First, OSHA and the ALJs generally decided
cases a s a matter of law and rigidly construed Sarbanes-Oxley's
legal requirements6 Second, for cases that survived this strict legal
scrutiny during the initial OSHA investigation, OSHA tended to

1. See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model To Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1117-19, 1123-24 [hereinafter Moberly, Structural
Model] (describing successful whistleblowing efforts).
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
3. See Table 3 infra.
4. See Table 1 infra.
5. See Table 1 infra.
6. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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misapply Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof regarding causation, to
the substantial detriment of employee^.^
These findings challenge the hope of scholars and whistleblower
advocates that Sarbanes-Oxley's legal boundaries and burden of
proof would often result in favorable outcomes for whistleblowers.
For example, soon after the Act's enactment, Professor Robert
Vaughn asserted that the statute is "the most important whistle~ Devine, legal director
blower protection law in the w ~ r l d . "Tom
for the Government Accountability Project, a whistleblower advocacy group, described the Act a s "the promised land .... [Tlhe law
represents a revolution in corporate freedom of speech [that] far
surpasses, indeed laps, the rights available for government worke r ~ . Taxpayers
"~
Against Fraud called the statute "the single most
effective measure possible to prevent recurrences of the Enron
debacle and similar threats to the nation's financial markets."1°
The language of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation protections
justified this initial reaction. Prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, millions of
workers were protected from retaliation for revealing corporate

7. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
8. Robert G. Vaughn, America's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 105 (2005); see also STEPHEN M. KOHNET AL.,
WHISTLEBLOWERLAW: A GUIDETO LEGAL PROTECTIONSFOR CORPORATE
EMPLOYEES
xii (2004)
(labeling Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provision "the most systemic whistleblower
protection framework enacted into federal lad'); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the
Workplace in a n Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM.L. REV. 319, 376 (2005) (calling the
provision the "gold standard" of whistleblower protection). But see Miriam A. Cherry,
Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, a n d the Implications of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act for Employment LAW,79 WASH.L. REV.1029,1034(2004) (concluding that
Sarbanes-Oxley is a 'Xalf-measure and not the true reform our securities laws need to
respond to corporate fraud). The popular press also predicted the law would protect
whistleblowers as never before. In 2002, Business Week stated that the Act "gives those who
report corporate misconduct sweeping new legal protection .... IW]histleblowers are going to
find life a bit easier." Paula Dwyer & Dan Carney, Year of the Whistleblower, BUS.WK., Dec.
16, 2002, a t 106; see also id. ("Corporate managers had better brace themselves.").
9. Blowing the Whistle on Corporate Wrongdoing: An Interview with Tom Devine, 23
MULTINATIONAL
MONITOR,Oct./Nov. 2002, available a t http://multinationalmonitor.org/
mm2002/02oct-novloct-nov02interviewdevine.html.
Additionally, Gregory Watchman, the
Executive Director of the Government Accountability Project, characterized the provisions as
a "major breakthrough in establishing whistleblower rights." GREGORY
R. WATCHMAN,
SARBANES-OXLEY
WHISTLEB~WERS:
A NEWCORPORATE
EARLYWARNING
SYSTEM
i , 8 (2004),
h t t p : / / w w w . w h i s t l e b l o w e r . o r g / d o c / g a p l G ~
10. S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t 10 (2002).
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wrongdoing only sporadically, if a t all." The Act now purports to
protect these workers by providing significant remedies for retaliation against corporate whistleblowers, including noneconomic
damages and reinstatement.12 Moreover, the congressionally mandated burden of proof for causation favors employees more than
many retaliation protections.13 Indeed, a few early victories for
employees sparked outrage from management attorneys, who
argued that Sarbanes-Oxley's protections were too broad and overly
burdensome for employers14-a sign that perhaps the Act provided
real protections for whistleblowers.
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's pro-whistleblower provisions and a
few early employee victories, however, administrative decisions
over the first three years of the Act's life failed to fulfill Congress's
11. See infra text accompanying notes 42-46; Vaughn, supra note 8, a t 9-12.
12. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(c) (Supp. IV 2004).
13. To prove causation under Sarbanes-Oxley, employees must demonstrate by a
preponderance of evidence that retaliation for engaging in protected activity was a
"contributing factor" to their adverse employment action. See infra text accompanying notes
62-64. To rebut a prima facie case, an employer must show by clear and convincing evidence
that it would have made the same employment decision in the absence of any protected
employee activity. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64. Employees should have an easier
time satisfying the "contributing factor" test than the "but for" causation test required by
some other retaliation provisions, such as Title VII. See Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399
F.3d 601,608 (5th Cir. 2005). Conversely, the "clear and convincing" standard for employers
should be more difficult than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard utilized elsewhere.
See Vaughn, supra note 8, a t 77.
14. See Cathleen Flahardy, SOX Gives DOL Power To Reinstate Whistleblowers:
Employers Struggle To Defend Themselves Against Wrongful Termination Claims, CORP.
LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2005, a t 24, available a t http://www.insidecounsel.com/issuesl
insidecounseUl5~165/labor/85-l.html
(stating that one ALJ employee win demonstrates'%ow
difficult it will be for companies to prove their cases in whistleblower suits under SOX'); Mary
E. Pivec, Whistleblower Protection Pitfalls: Innocent Companies Are Drained in Defending
Adverse-Action Claims, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 2005, a t 28; Michael Starr & Adam J. Heft,
Whistleblower Protections a n d the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 4, 2005, a t 12
(discussing three early AW decisions in favor of the employee and concluding that "[biased
on these [early] decisions, SOX may reach a broader range of conduct and provide a more
potent array of remedies than most employers had anticipated"). Two management attorney
commentators concluded that one ALJ decision in favor of a n employee "looms as a foreboding
omnipresence to employers who were hoping for a restrictive interpretation" of SarbanesOxley. Id. a t 14; see also John B. Chiara & Michael D. Orenstein, Note: Whistler's Nocturne
in Black a n d Gold-The Falling Rocket: Why the Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblower Provision
Falls Short of the Mark, 23 HOFSTRALAB. & EMF'. L.J. 235, 267 (2005) ("Sarbanes-Oxley's
whistleblowers have an easier time gaining protection than do employees under other
whistleblower acts.... [Wlhat remains to be seen is whether the employer has been placed in
too vulnerable a position.").
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expectation that a strong anti-retaliation provision would protect
whistleblowers. This Article explains why.
Part I of the Article provides a brief summary of Sarbanes-Oxley's
substantive and procedural requirements. Part I1 summarizes the
scope and methodology of my empirical study examining why
employees rarely won Sarbanes-Oxley cases. This study examined
all Department of Labor Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed and resolved
during the first three years of Sarbanes-Oxley's existence, totaling
over 700 separate decisions from two levels of administrative
investigations and hearings. As explained in Part 11, the scope of
this study differs from previous empirical studies of employment
cases in two fundamental ways. First, rather than rely only on
published decisions to comprise a sample of examined cases,15this
study collected all administrative decisions involving SarbanesOxley's anti-retaliation provision. Data from this census of cases
allow stronger inferences than data derived from a sample of
published cases.16 Second, some previous employment law studies
relied upon data collected by the government; although such
datasets contain a large number of cases, analyses usually produce
only general outcome or procedural data about each case.17 By
contrast, this study involved in-depth coding of decisions to obtain
detailed data that permitted nuanced analyses of the rationales
provided by decision makers in their determinations.18 The breadth
of data produced by a census of cases and the depth of data resulting
from the coding process permitted a truly comprehensive analysis
of Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative decisions.
15. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabi1itiesAct:A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 103-04(1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall];Ruth Colker,
Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIOST. L.J. 239,244
(2001)[hereinafter Colker, Winning];Ann Juliano & Stewart J . Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual
L. REV. 548, 556 (2001);David Benjamin Oppenheimer,
Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL
Verdicts Matter An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful
Discharge Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 511, 532 (2003); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in
Employment, 81 NOTREDAME L. REV. 889,897-99(2006).
16. See discussion infra Part 11.
17. See, e.g., Kevin M . Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICALL. STUD.429, 429-30(2004);Laura Beth
Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical Analysis of Employment
Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 663,687-701.
18. See discussion infra Part 11.
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Part I11 of the Article presents the study's results. The first
section describes the low employee win rate a t the two different
levels of administrative review-the initial investigation conducted
by OSHA and any subsequent hearing before a n ALJ. The second
section analyzes the rationales OSHA and the ALJs provided when
finding for the employer and examines whether the employee lost
because (1) the employee violated a "procedural" rule, such a s the
statute of limitations; (2) the employee's claim failed a s a matter of
law for not fitting within Sarbanes-Oxley's legal "boundaries"; or (3)
the decision maker determined that the facts did not demonstrate
"causation," meaning that the employee's whistleblowing did not
actually cause any adverse employment action.lg
The analysis in Part I11 provides two explanations for SarbanesOxley's low employee win rate. First, employees frequently lost
because OSHA and the ALJs determined that a large number of
employees either violated a procedural rule or did not meet
Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory requirements a s a matter of law (that
is, the employees did not demonstrate that their claim fit within
the Act's legal "boundaries"). Thus, OSHA and the ALJs rejected a
large percentage of cases (66.7% for OSHA, 95.2% for ALJs) for
failing to fit within the legal parameters of a Sarbanes-Oxley
claim, thereby avoiding any determination of the factual merits of
a n employee's allegation^.^' In so doing, these administrative
decision makers often strictly interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley's legal
requirements. For example, whistleblowers rarely were equitably
excused for missing a procedural deadline, such as the statute of
limitation^.^^ Moreover, although Sarbanes-Oxley applies to a "contractor, subcontractor, or agent"22of any publicly-traded company,
ALJs consistently determined that the Act did not protect employees
of privately-held subsidiaries and contractors of publicly-traded
companies.23 Furthermore, U s and the Administrative Review
Board (ARB) (the last level of administrative review) required
extraordinary specificity from whistleblowers regarding their
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See discussion infra Part 1II.B.
See discussion infra Part III.B.l.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
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disclosure of illegal activity and refused to protect whistleblowers
who disclosed general fraud a s opposed to fraud related specifically
to ~ e c u r i t i e s . ~ ~
This strict legal scrutiny might have many causes; I posit that it
likely resulted from the push and pull of defining a new statute's
legal boundaries. Employees, perhaps relying on expectations
generated by scholars and whistleblower advocates, brought claims
that tested the boundaries of this new statute. Administrative
decision makers responded by interpreting potentially ambiguous
provisions of the statute narrowly.
Second, the low employee win rate also resulted from OSHA's
tendency to misapply Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof for the few
cases that survived the agency's strict legal scrutiny. Despite a
burden of proof for causation that clearly favors employees, OSHA
decided in favor of the employee in only 10.7% of the cases in which
it evaluated the causation element of a n employee's allegations
(meaning cases in which a decision maker determined that the
case fell within the legal "boundaries" of a Sarbanes-Oxley claim).25
By contrast, when ALJs adjudicated causation, employees won
55.6% of the time.26I suggest that OSHA's regulations and budgetary restraints contributed to its failure to apply Sarbanes-Oxley's
burden of proof appropriately.
In Part IV, based on the findings of this study, I offer suggestions
for statutory changes and interpretations that would better reflect
Congress's goals of protecting whistleblowers and remedying
retaliation. First, fully one-third of all employees who lost a t the
ALJ Level and 18% who lost a t the OSHA Level lost because the
employee failed to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's short 90-day statute of
limitation^.^^ Because this procedural issue has little to do with the
substantive merits of the whistleblower's claim, I suggest extending
this statute of limitations to a minimum of 180 days.28 This
extension will make the Act's limitations period similar to those
found in equivalent whistleblower protection statutes and also
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See discussion infra Part III.B.2.-W.B.
See Table 8 infra.
See Table 8 infra.
See Table 4 infra.
See discussion infra Part 1V.A.
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should provide a more reasonable period of time for whistleblowers
to file complaints.
Second, the Act's legal "boundaries" should be clarified. When
OSHA and the ALJs interpreted Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory boundaries, these administrative decision makers strictly examined two
areas in particular: whether the respondent was a "covered employer" and whether the employee engaged i n "protected a~tivity."~'
Part N recommends statutory changes that could be implemented
to clarify Congress's intent for broad whistleblower protections in
' example,
the face of this overly-rigid administrative ~ c r u t i n y . ~For
Congress should clarify that employees of certain privately-held
companies are protected from retaliation when they report fraud a t
publicly-traded corporations. Moreover, Congress should amend the
Act to explicitly overrule administrative decisions that require a
whistleblower disclosure to relate to securities fraud, a s opposed to
general fraud, and decisions that fail to protect employees who
refuse to engage in illegal activity. I also suggest that OSHA and the
Office of Administrative Law Judges publicize and disseminate
certain statistical and substantive information about SarbanesOxley cases in order to further clarify their interpretations of the
Act's legal protections and to moderate any bias toward a particular
party.
Third, the Act's employee-friendly burden of proof regarding
causation needs to be revitalized by altering OSHA's investigative
procedures and providing OSHA more investigative resource^.^^
As a n alternative, I suggest removing OSHA from its current
investigative role and replacing OSHA's process with one of three
substitutes: (1)permitting whistleblowers to file claims directly in
federal court; (2) beginning the Sarbanes-Oxley administrative
process with hearings before a n ALJ rather t h a n with a n OSHA
investigation; or (3) assigning OSHA's investigative responsibilities
to another agency, such a s the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).32 Any of these options could address OSHA's current
misapplication of the Act's burden of proof scheme.
29. See discussion infra Part N.B.
30. See discussion infra Part N.B.
31. See discussion infra Part N . C .
32. See discussion infra Part N.C.
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I n the last section of Part IVYI suggest that further research
needs to examine whether Sarbanes-Oxley's failures should lead
Congress to enact broader whistleblower protections.33For example,
Sarbanes-Oxley currently applies only to employees of publiclytraded corporations. To avoid the difficult line-drawing issues
detailed in the results of this study, a broader whistleblower
provision could apply to employers with a specific number of
employees, which would clarify the Act's applicability by importing
a well-known standard from other employee protection statutes.
Furthermore, the Act currently protects only employees who
disclose illegalities related to six specific areas of federal law.
Providing statutory protections for whistleblowers who report any
unlawful activity by their employer would clarify the extent of
protections available to employees. These points are mentioned but
not fully explored here because further research is necessary to
analyze whether these benefits outweigh t h e potential costs of such
broader protections.
Ultimately, Sarbanes-Oxleyfailed to fulfill the great expectations
generated by the Act's purportedly strong anti-retaliation protections. Examining the reasons for this failure can provide insight
to improve the Act. Specifically, the results suggest a n urgent need
for a legislative and administrative reevaluation of SarbanesOxley's anti-retaliation provision. The underenforcement of this
provision undermines Congress's policy goal of deterring corporate
fraud and leaves literally millions of private sector employees
vulnerable to retaliation. Moreover, the study's findings can provide
general lessons for the drafters of future whistleblower protection
efforts and should serve a s a reminder of the difficulty of transferring the idealistic legislative goal of broad employee protection into
realistic rights and attainable remedies.

I n congressional hearings investigating the stunning collapse of
Enron in 2002, whistleblower Sherron Watkins revealed crucial
33. See discussion infra Part N.D.
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details regarding Enron's fraudulent a ~ t i v i t i e sI.n~later
~
hearings
regarding WorldCom's subsequent collapse, testimony from
WorldCom officers demonstrated that a n internal auditor named
Cynthia Cooper discovered the massive fraud orchestrated by the
company's chief financial officer and reported it to the board of
d i r e ~ t o r s .Given
~ ~ the importance of such employee disclosures,
Congress considered it necessary to break the "corporate code of
silence" t h a t discouraged potential whistleblowers from coming
forward.36Accordingly, Sarbanes-Oxley contains several provisions
aimed a t encouraging employees to disclose information about
corporate wrongdoing.
First, and most p r ~ m i n e n t l y Congress
,~~
created a n anti-retaliation provision to protect whistleblowers from adverse employment
actions.38Second, Sarbanes-Oxley also contains criminal penalties
for individuals who retaliate against employees who "blow the
whistle" to law enforcement authorities about violations of federal
law.39 Third, the Act requires that corporations create a whistleblower disclosure channel for employees to report misconduct
anonymously to the corporate board of director^.^' Finally, the Act
requires attorneys to report evidence of material securities law

34. See The Financial Collapse of Enron-Part 3: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 14-66
(2002) (testimony of Sherron Watkins).
35. See Wrong Numbers: The Accounting Problems at WorldCom: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Serus., 107th Cong. 129 (2002) (statement of John W . Sidgmore, President &
CEO, WorldCom, Inc.).
36. S. REP.NO. 107-146, at 4-5 (2002).
37. W i t h regard to whistleblower encouragement, academic and public attention has
focused primarily on Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provisions. See, e.g., KOHN ET AL.,
supra note 8; Leonard M . Baynes, Just Pucker and Blow?: A n Analysis of Corporate
Whistleblowers, the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 875 (2002);Cherry, supra note 8; Vaughn, supra note 8; Ashlea Ebeling,
(June 18, 2003), http://www.forbes.com/
Blowing the Sarbanes-&ley Whistle, FORBES.COM
2003/06/18/cx~ae~0618beltwaygrint.html.
38. The anti-retaliation provision is Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud
Accountability Act, which was included as Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act o f 2002 8 806, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
39. See id. 3 1107, 18 U.S.C. 8 1513(e)(Supp. IV 2004).
40. See id. 8 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A)(Supp.IV 2004);seegenerally Moberly, supra
note 1 (analyzing this provision as a method of encouraging whistleblowers).
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violations to corporate officers or the board of director^.^^ This
Article focuses on Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision.

A. The Anti-retaliation Protections of the Act
Congress viewed the anti-retaliation protections a s particularly
important because, a t the time, federal and state laws failed to
protect employees consistently if they reported corporate malfeasance. Rather, corporate whistleblowers were "subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws, although most publicly
traded companies do business n a t i ~ n w i d e . "Prior
~ ~ to SarbanesOxley, protections for whistleblowers varied by the state in which
the employee worked43 and the type of retaliation the employee
endured.44Federal law protected only whistleblowers who reported
certain types of violations in certain i n d u ~ t r i e sThus,
. ~ ~ employees
had difficulty predicting whether they would be protected from
retaliation a s a result of reporting wrongdoing. Needless to say, this
difficulty discouraged employees from consistently coming forward
with i n f ~ r m a t i o n . ~ ~
The protections of Sarbanes-Oxley's anti-retaliation provision
purport to address some of these problems. First, to address the
"patchwork of state laws, Sarbanes-Oxley applies nationally to
41. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 3 307, 15 U.S.C. 3 7245(1) (Supp. W 2004).
42. S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t 10 (2002).
43. States vary widely in the type of protections they provide. Some states, like Georgia,
provide little protection to employee whistleblowers. See GA. CODEANN. 3 34-7-1 (2005) (atwill employment provision); Goodroe v. Ga. Power Co., 251 S.E.2d 51,52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)
(finding that Georgia's employment-at-will statute permitted employer to fire employee
because employee was about to uncover criminal activities). Others, like New Jersey, have
broad statutes protecting any whistleblower who reports any violation of law. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. 3 34:19-3 (West 2006). As Congress noted, "a whistleblowing employee in one state may
be far more vulnerable to retaliation than a fellow employee in another state who takes the
same actions." S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t 10 (2002).
44. Some laws protect employees only if they are discharged and do not address other
forms of retaliation. See, e.g., White v. State, 929 P.2d 396, 407 (Wash. 1997) (limiting
retaliation suit to cases in which employee was actually or constructively discharged).
45. See, e.g., STEPHEN
M. KOHN,CONCEPTS
AND PROCEDURES
IN WHISTLEBLOWER
LAW 7980 (2001); MARCIA P. MICELI &JANETP. NEAR,BLOWING THE WHISTLE:THEORGANIZATIONAL
AND LEGALIMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANIES
AND EMPLOYEES
233-34 (1992).
46. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM277, 286 (1983).
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employees of all publicly-traded ~ o m p a n i e s . ~The
' Act's coverage
extends beyond a particular industry and reaches all companies that
issue publicly-traded shares.48
Second, to correct the lack of protection for employees who report
the type of securities fraud and accounting irregularities that led
to the corporate scandals, Sarbanes-Oxley specifically protects
employees who engage in protected activity related to fraud. To be
protected, the subject matter of the whistleblower's report must
relate to violations of one of six different types of laws, many of
which are related to securities or accounting fraud.49The breadth of
protected activity related to that topic actually could be quite
expan~ive.'~
Employees are protected if they "provide information,
cause information to be provided, or otherwise assist in a n investigation regarding" such violation^.^' Further, the whistleblower
does not need to report a n actual violation of the law; rather, the
employee must "reasonably believe" that a violation occurred.52
The employee can provide information to any one of numerous
recipients: a federal regulatory or law enforcement agency; any
member of any committee of Congress; or a person with "supervisory
The Act protects a whistleblowauthority" over the whi~tleblower.'~
er who "file[s], cause[s] to be filed, testiflies], participate[s] in, or

47. 18 U.S.C. 9 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
48. The Act applies to any "company with a class of securities registered under section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 5 781), or that is required to file reports
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. $ 780(d))." 18 U.S.C. 8
1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004). The Act also applies to any "officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent of such company." See id.
49. The statute protects activity related to violations of sections 1341 (mail fraud); 1343
(wire fraud); 1344 (bank fraud); and 1348 (securities fraud) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, or
"any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders." 18 U.S.C. 3 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004);
see also id. $ (a)(2).
50. See Vaughn, supra note 8, a t 22-50 (discussing broad readings of Sarbanes-Oxley's
statutory language); see also discussion infra Part IV.B (supporting a broad reading of this
language).
51. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004).
52. See id.This standard is more protective of employees than other caselaw and statutes
that require a whistleblowing employee to be correct in their disclosure of illegal activity. See,
e.g., DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1992); Bordell v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996).
53. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a)(l)(C) (Supp. IV 2004).
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otherwise assist[s] in a proceeding" related to violations of the same
laws and regulation^.^^
Finally, the remedies for a violation of the Act seem appropriately
set to discourage retaliation. OSHA may immediately reinstate a
whistleblower if a n initial OSHA investigation finds reasonable
cause to believe retaliation occurred.55I n addition to the standard
back pay award, whistleblowers also could receive special damages
including attorneys' fees, litigation costs, and expert witness fees.56

B. The Procedure for Filing a Whistleblower Complaint
Congress specifically incorporated into Sarbanes-Oxley the
procedural rules of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and
Reform Act for the 21st C e n t ~ r y , ~
also
' known a s "AIR21," which
provides whistleblower protection for employees who report
airline safety problems.58 Consequently, Congress charged OSHA
with the responsibility for investigating Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower complaint^.^^ Subsequent to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley,
OSHA issued specific regulations that detail the procedure for such

54. Id. $ 1514A(a)(2).
55. See id. $ 1514A(c)(2)(A);29 C.F.R. $ 1980.105(a)(l)(2006); see also Vaughn, supra note
8, a t 97 11.400 (noting benefits of reinstatement a s a remedy).
56. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(c)(2)(B)-(C)(Supp. IV 2004); see also KOHNET AL., supra note
8, a t 111(noting that Sarbanes-Oxley is one of only four federal statutes that permit recovery
of attorney fees a s part of "special damages" that must be awarded, as opposed to part of a feeshifting scheme that gives courts discretion to deny the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees
to an employee).
57. Pub. L. No. 106-181, $ 519(b), 114 Stat. 61, 146-47 (2000) (codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
58. See id. $519,114 Stat. a t 145; 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(b)(2)(A)(Supp. IV 2004) (providing
that, with few exceptions, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower actions "shall be governed under the
rules and procedures set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code").
59. Commentators initially questioned whether OSHA, an agency mainly responsible for
workplace safety, could adequately investigate claims involving "complex matters of corporate
securities laws and other financial and accountancy laws and practices." Procedures for the
Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal
Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg.
52,104 (Aug. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Procedures]; see also Cherry, supra note 8, a t 1083 n.383
(questioning the choice of OSHA as Sarbanes-Oxley investigative agency). OSHA defended
the choice by noting that it administers thirteen other whistleblower statutes, all of which
involve protecting whistleblowers. See Procedures a t 52,104-05.
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whistleblower claims and that, for the most part, mirror AIR2l's

procedure^.^^
After a n employee files a complaint with OSHA, the agency
informs the named respondents and the SEC of the a l l e g a t i ~ n . ~ '
OSHA will dismiss the complaint without any investigation under
two conditions. First, OSHA will dismiss complaints that do not
make a prima facie showing of retaliation that: (1) the employee
engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew about the
activity; (3) the employee suffered a n unfavorable personnel action;
and (4) the "circumstances were sufficient to raise the inference that
the protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
action."62 Second, if a n inference of retaliation can be drawn, then
OSHA will dismiss a complaint if the employer demonstrates by
clear and convincing evidence that the adverse employment action
would have been taken regardless of the protected activity.63The
employer has twenty days from receiving notice of the complaint to
provide statements or documents presenting its position.64
If a n employee presents a prima facie case and the employer fails
to meet its clear and convincing burden of proof, then OSHA will
. ~ ~ regulations require OSHA to issue
conduct a n i n v e ~ t i g a t i o nThe
written findings from the investigation within sixty days of the
filing of the complaint regarding whether it finds reasonable cause
to believe that retaliation in violation of the Act occurred.66OSHA
makes this determination using the same burden of proof scheme a s
with its initial preinvestigation decision.67
Sarbanes-Oxley's burden of proof is employee-friendly for two
reasons. First, the Act adopted the "contributing factor" test for
60. See generally Procedures, supra note 59, at 52,104-17.
61. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(a) (2006). The regulations delegate the authority to
investigate and issue determinations regarding Sarbanes-Oxley claims to OSHA's Assistant
Secretary. See Secretary's Order 5-2002,67 Fed. Reg. 65,008 (Oct. 22,2002). In the following
description of Sarbanes-Oxley'sprocedural regulations, I use the convenient (and intuitive)
term "OSHA"rather than "Assistant Secretary,"which is used by the regulations, because the
Assistant Secretary is acting on behalf of the agency.
62. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(b)(l) (2006).
63. See id. 5 1980.104(c).
64. See id.
65. See id. 5 1980.104(d).
66. See id. 5 1980.105.
67. See id.
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cau~ation.~'
To be a contributing factor, the protected activity must
simply be one factor, "alone or in combination with other factors,"
that "tends to affect in any way the outcome of the de~ision."~'
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers can satisfy this burden of proof more
easily than employees under many other employment provisions.
The "contributing factor" causation test demands less evidence than
the "causal" language required for Title VII retaliation cases7' and
perhaps even less than the "motivating factor" language utilized in
Title VII "mixed-motive" cases7' As stated by the ARB in a
Sarbanes-Oxley case, this test is specifically "intended to overrule
existing case law, which requires a whistleblower to prove that his
protected conduct was a significant, motivating, substantial, or
predominant factor in a personnel action i n order to overturn that
a~tion."'~In implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley regulations, the
Department of Labor also recognized the "contributing factor" test
a s less onerous for a n employee to satisfy than other causation
tests.73

68. See 18 U.S.C. 3 1514A(b)(2)(C)(Supp. IV 2004) (adopting the burden of proof standard
from AIR21,49 U.S.C. 5 42121(b)); 49 U.S.C. $42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2000); 29 C.F.R. 1 1980.104
(2006).
69. See Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, a t 18 (ARB May 31,
2006) (quoting Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
70. See, e.g., Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601,608 (5th Cir. 2005) ("The proper
standard of proof on the causation element of a Title VII retaliation claim is that the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff would not have occurred 'but for' her protected
conduct.").
71. In its explanation of this provision, OSHA noted that:
The "contributing factor" language used in this section is identical to that used
in the employee protection provisions of the ERA and AIR21, under which there
is sufficient case law interpreting the phrase. For example, in Kester v. Carolina
Power & Light Co., No. 02-007,2003 WL 22312696, * 8 (Adm. Rev. Bd. Sept. 30,
2003), the ARB noted: "[Plrior to the 1992 amendments, the ERA complainant
was required to prove that protected activity was a 'motivating factor' in the
employer's decision. Congress adopted the less onerous 'contributing factor'
standard 'in order to facilitate relief for employees who have been retaliated
against for exercising their [whistleblower rights].' 138 Cong. Rec. No. 142 (Oct.
5, 1992).
Procedures, supra note 59, a t 52,107.
72. See Klopfenstein, No. 04-149, a t 18 (quoting Marano v. Dep't of Justice, 2 F.3d 1137,
1140 (Fed. Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. See Procedures, supra note 59, a t 52,107.
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Second, after establishing causation and the other prerequisites
of the prima facie case, the employee should win unless the employer demonstrates that it would have made the same decision
absent any protected activity. Significantly, the employer's burden
must be satisfied under the "clear and convincing" standard,74which
requires a higher level of proof than the typical "preponderance of
the evidence" standard utilized by other anti-retaliation statutes.75
The U.S. Supreme Court described the level of proof needed to
rigorous standard for
satisfy this standard a s "highly pr~bable"~~-a
employers to satisfy.77
After applying these standards of proof, if OSHA finds reasonable
cause to believe that a violation occurred, then OSHA "shall" issue
a preliminary order of relief to the employee.78This order "shall"
include
all relief necessary to make the employee whole, including,
where appropriate: reinstatement with the same seniority status
that the employee would have had but for the discrimination;
back pay with interest; and compensation for any special
damages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including
litigation costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable attorney's
fees."

OSHA may order reinstatement to begin immediately, even if the
employer requests further review of the order.80 Although such
orders appear mandatory given the use of the term "shall," the
regulations provide that reinstatement may not be appropriate if

74. See Halloum v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7, a t 10 ( A U Mar. 4, 2004); Welch v. Cardinal
Bankshares Corp., 2003-SOX-15, a t 44 ( A U Aug. 1,2003); see also Vaughn, supra note 8, a t
77.
75. See Halloum, 2003-SOX-7, a t 10; Welch, 2003-SOX-15, a t 47; see also Vaughn, supra
note 8, a t 77.
76. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310,316 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also KOHNET AL., supra note 8, a t 62.
77. See Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp. v. Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1572 (11th Cir. 1997)
(recognizing under the same statutory framework found in the Energy Reorganization Act,
42 U.S.C. § 5851, that "[flor employers, this is a tough standard").
78. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.105(a)(l) (2006).
79. Id.
80. See id. § 1980.105(c).
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the employer demonstrates that the employee is a "security risk.""
Of course, if reasonable cause is not found, then OSHA simply will
notify the parties of that finding.82
The parties have thirty days to request further review from an
administrative law judge; otherwise, OSHA's initial findings and
order will become the final order of the Department of Labor.83If a
hearing is requested, a n ALJ conducts a de novo hearing regarding
the c ~ m p l a i n tU. ~ ~s have broad discretion regarding the extent of
discovery permitted and the type of evidence allowed.85
Appeals from a n AU decision must be made within ten days of
the decision to the Department of Labor's Administrative Review
B ~ a r d . 'The
~ ARB has discretion to take the case for review; if it
has not done so within thirty days of the decision, the ALJ's decision
will become the final determination of the agency.87If the ARB
chooses to review the ALJ's determination, it must apply a "substantial evidence" standard and must issue a final decision within
120 days of the conclusion of the AU hearing.88 Appeals from a n
ARB decision are made to a federal circuit court of appeals.89
Finally, the Act gives whistleblowers the option of filing a claim
in federal court. Sarbanes-Oxley permits employees-not employers-to remove the case to federal district court if the Department
of Labor does not completely resolve a complaint within 180 days,
including a decision by the ARB if a p p r ~ p r i a t eThis
. ~ ~ option almost
certainly will be available for employees, because it is unlikely that
the entire process will be completed in that period of time; in Fiscal
Year 2005, a n initial OSHA investigation itself took a n average of
127 days to ~omplete.~'
81. Id. 5 1980.105(a)(l).
82. See id. 3 1980.105(a)(2).
83. See id. 5 1980.106.
84. See id. 5 1980.107(b).
85. See id. 5 1980.107(d).
86. See id. 5 1980.110.
87. See id. § 1980.110(b).
88. See id. 5 1980.110(b)-(c).
89. See id. 5 1980.112(a).
90. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(b)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
91. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Feb. 15,2006) (on file with author). This time period has grown significantly longer since the
enactment of OSHA; in Fiscal Year 2003, the average length of a Sarbanes-Oxley
investigation was 92 days. See id.;see also Allen v. Stewart Enter., No. 05-059, at 3 n.5 (ARB
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As written, Sarbanes-Oxley appears to provide strong substantive and procedural protections for whistleblowers. The Act includes
favorable provisions for whistleblowers to file claims easily, to
benefit from a favorable burden of proof, to obtain immediate
reinstatement, and to file in federal court if desired. Why, then, did
so few employees win during the first three years of the Act's
existence? The purpose of the present study is to analyze OSHA and
ALJ decisions empirically to discover patterns of decision making
that, a t least in part, answer this question.

, ~ ~ differs
This section summarizes the study's m e t h o d ~ l o g ywhich
from previous empirical studies of employment law decisions in
' ~ Americans with Disabilities
areas such a s sexual h a r a ~ s m e n t , the
race d i s ~ r i m i n a t i o n ,general
~~
employment discrimination
cases in federal court,96 and California jury verdicts in employment discrimination and wrongful discharge cases.97 These
studies obtained their data either by examining published judicial
decisionsg8 (the 'Westlaw" approach) or by utilizing a n outcome
database managed by a federal agencyg9(the "Database" approach).
Professors Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg describe these
Aug. 17,2005) (noting that employees dismissed their appeal in order to file in federal district
court and stating that "[als is the usual case, the 180-day period for deciding the case had
expired before the [employees] filed their petition with the Board").
92. A more detailed description of the study's methodology can be found on the web.
See Richard E. Moberly, Methodology of Empirical Study for Unfilled Expectations Article,
http://www.wm.ed~aw/publicationsfla~eviewId0~umentdmethodo10gy.pdf
(last visited Sept.
22, 2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Methodology].
93. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t 549-50.
94. See Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, a t 103-04; Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t 244.
95. See Parker, supra note 15, a t 893.
96. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t 429; Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, a t
664.
97. See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, a t 538.
98. See, e.g., Colker, Windfall, supra note 15, a t 103 (utilizing Westlaw to find published
opinions); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t 244 (utilizing Westlaw to find published
opinions); Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t 556 (utilizing Westlaw and LexisNexis to find
published opinions); Oppenheimer, supra note 15, a t 532 (utilizing California jury verdict
reporters); Parker, supra note 15, a t 897-99 (utilizing Westlaw to find published opinions).
99. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t 429-30 (utilizing Administrative Office
data); Nielsen & Nelson, supra note 17, a t 687-91 (utilizing EEOC statistics); id. a t 692-701
(utilizing Administrative Office data).
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methods a s the two most commonly employed of the three types of
empirical legal studies currently being conducted.100 Professors
Clermont and Eisenberg, however, reserve their highest praise for
the third type of empirical study they identify-a study in which
researchers gather their own dataset from original sources for
subsequent statistical analysis.'0' The study presented in this
Article follows this third and less-traveled path described by
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg. Although more labor intensive,
the third path offers significant advantages over the other two
methods.

A. Complete Census us. Sampling
First, this study evaluates "broader" data than that typically
mined by the Westlaw approach. The Westlaw method can produce
nuanced descriptive data if researchers follow social science
methods of coding and analyzing the cases.lo2However, the data
come from a narrow pool of cases, because the cases available on a
database such a s Westlaw constitute a nonrepresentative fraction of the cases actually decided by agencies and courts.lo3 This
well-documented "tip of the iceberg" limitation produces data with
limited breadth, from which researchers can draw only limited
inferences to the entire population of cases filed.''*
By contrast, the study described in this Article addressed these
limitations by examining all decisions issued by OSHA and the
100. See Kevin M.Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELLL.
REV.119,125-26(2002).
101. See id. at 126.
Parker, supra note 15,at 899-900(describing methodology i n which
102. See id. at 125-26;
research assistants coded opinions for 61 factors).
103. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100,at 125-26(noting that "published decisions
are a skewed sample" of all judicial decisions); Colker, Windfall, supra note 15,at 103-04
(recognizing this limitation); Colker, Winning, supra note 15, at 246 (acknowledging the
"selection bias" inherent i n examining appellate cases by searching Westlaw);Juliano &
Schwab, supra note 15,at 557 (acknowledging that studying only published judicial opinions
"may not be a random sample of all judicial decisions").
104. See Peter Siegelman & John J . Donohue 111, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A
Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW &
Soc'YRw.1133,1144(1990)(warning researchers that published judicial opinions represent
less than 15 percent of employment discrimination complaints filed); see also Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 100,at 125-26(noting that when studying only published opinions, "it
is tough to infer truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what lies below disputes").
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Office of Administrative Law Judges (OALJ) under the SarbanesOxley Act. This dataset thus represents what social scientists call
a "census," or a n entire population of cases-not merely a n unrepresentative sample of cases. Analyzing a census resolves the "tip of
the iceberg" problem that inherently limits the inferential strength
of data obtained only from a commercial database of published
decision^."^ Thus, this Article can draw stronger inferences from the
broader dataset of a census than inferences drawn from a n unrepresentative sample.

B. Original Sources us. Secondary Compilations
Second, this study evaluates "deeper" data than data available
through the Database approach. The Database method typically
produces data from a broad, comprehensive pool of cases, but the set
of data itself is limited and narrow. For example, the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts maintains a database for all
federal cases.lo6 Scholars generally regard the Administrative
Office data a s reliable and valid1'' but recognize that it provides
limited data, typically about only procedural issues and outcomes.108
By contrast, this study evaluated the original source of administrative Sarbanes-Oxley decisions: the written decisions themselves.
Moreover, this study coded information contained in these decisions
using rigorously applied social scientific methods, thus yielding
105. Given that this study examines only cases actually filed under Sarbanes-Oxley, this
study gives insight into a much greater part of the "iceberg" of disputes than the Westlaw
approach. However, the study does not provide insight into the entire iceberg, that is, it does
not consider disputes in which a case is settled, ignored or otherwise disposed of before a
formal complaint is filed with OSHA.
106. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, a t 429-30.
107. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100, a t 127-29 (discussing the database's
strengths and weaknesses).
108. See id. a t 127 (noting that the forms used to compile the Administrative Office
database include "data regarding the names of the parties, the subject-matter category and
the jurisdictional basis of the case, the case's origin in the district a s original or removed or
transferred. the amount demanded. the dates of filing and termination in the district court
or the court of appeals, the procedural stage of the case a t termination, the procedural method
of disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached decision, the prevailing party and
the relief granted); id. a t 128 (''[Yhe Administrative Office data do not contain many other
things one would like to know. They show no particulars of each lawsuit.") (emphasis added);
id. a t 129 (''More generally, the Administrative Office's data are just a bunch of codes about
a limited number of case features.").
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more nuanced, "deeper" data beyond simply procedural or outcome
information. I n short, this study produced detailed and complex
data, such a s the types of factual allegations made by the whistleblower and the rationales used by the decision maker--data that are
not analyzed in studies utilizing the Database method because such
information is simply not available for analysis in the governmentcompiled databases.log Data gathered from original sources, a s
employed i n this study, present a more intricate and thus complete
picture of a set of claims and their resolutions than data obtained
through the Database method.l1°
Both the Westlaw method and the Database method have
strengths and weaknesses. The method used in the research
reported in this Article, however, retains the advantages of each of
the other two methods while minimizing their corresponding
disadvantages. I n sum, to determine why so few employees succeeded in Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation cases, this study gathered
original data that were both broad-covering a census of cases-and
deep-including descriptions of the important particulars of the
cases.

C. The Specifics
This study examined decisions from the first two levels of
Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative process: (1)the initial decision by
109. OSHA does collect some data related to its Sarbanes-Oxley decisions; however, the
data available to the public are generally limited to outcome data for each case, that is,
whether the complainant or respondent won, or if the case was withdrawn or settled. With
regard to the U s , on April 28, 2005, the OALJ stopped compiling statistics for SarbanesOxley cases related to the type of disposition a t the ALJ Level. See E-mail from Todd Smyth,
Office of Administrative Law Judges, to author (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author). Before
that date, the OALJ collected only outcome statistics, not the more complex data obtained by
this study. See id.
110. Of course, all studies have limitations. One limitation of relying on written decisions
is that the data are derived from what OSHA investigators and U s determine is important
in a case. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15, a t 558-59 (discussing this limitation). With
this limitation in mind, strong inferences can still be drawn in this Article because my
analysis focuses on the rationales provided by these decision makers, thus minimizing the
study's limitation. Nonetheless, the limitation is important to consider when addressing a
party's factual allegations, because these allegations are described through the lens of a
decision maker justifying his or her result. See id. a t 559 (cautioning that a researcher using
data derived from judicial decisions should be "sophisticated and somewhat tentative in the
conclusions" drawn from such decisions).
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OSHA, a s set forth in a decision letter sent to the parties from
the Secretary of Labor (the "OSHA Level"); and (2) if the parties
requested a hearing with a n administrative law judge, the decision
published by the ALJ (the "ALJ Level"). The study included all
OSHA Level decisions from the first Sarbanes-Oxleycomplaint filed
on August 19, 2002, through complaints filed on July 13,2005 (470
observations), a s well a s all decisions from the ALJ Level, from the
effective date of the Act through J u n e 1, 2006 (236 observations).
This census of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions involved 491 complainants
a t the OSHA Level and 237 complainants a t the ALJ Level."'
The study was divided into two phases in which cases from each
level (OSHA and ALJ) were analyzed and coded separately on Excel
spreadsheets. The cases were coded for numerous variables: 134
variables for OSHA decisions and 121 variables for AW opinions.l12
Code books named, described, and exemplified each variable. When
codes classified data, the code books enumerated and exemplified
specific criteria for making a decision on the applicability of a
~ariable."~
In general, each level of cases was coded for the following
categories of variables:
descriptive variables related to the employee, including gender,
whether the employee was represented by a n attorney, and the
employee's job title;
variables describing the allegations made by the employee
related to (1) the type of retaliation allegedly suffered by the
employee; (2) the type of protected activity in which the
111. The OSHA decisions were obtained from OSHA through a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request, while the ALJ decisions were obtained from the website of the Office of
Administrative Law Judges. Each ALJ opinion in a Sarbanes-Oxley case is published a t U.S.
Dep't of Labor, http:l/www.oalj.dol.gov/LIBWHIST.htm (last visited Sept. 22,2007).
112. A well-regarded study of published sexual harassment court opinions utilized a similar
methodology for coding written opinions by decision makers, although the coding variables
used in that study and this study obviously differ. See Juliano & Schwab, supra note 15,55560.
113. Coders used a ffity-nine-page code book to code the ALJ opinions. See Richard E.
Moberly, Code Book: Empirical Study ofALJDecisions Under the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002,
httpdlwww. wm.ed~awlpublicationda~~eviewldocumentdaljcodebook.pdf
a s visited Sept.
28,2007). They used a separate ffity-nine-pagecode book for the OSHA decisions. See Richard
E. Moberly, Code Book: Empirical Study of OSHA Investigations Under the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, http:l/www. wm.eddawlpublicationdawreviewldocuments1codebook.p (last
visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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employee claimed to have engaged; (3) the position of the
person to whom the employee was alleged to have provided
information regarding illegal activity; and (4) the type of illegal
activity the employee claimed to have reported;
outcome variables identifying whether the case ended in a win
for the employee, a win for the employer, a withdrawal by the
employee, a settlement, or was sent to arbitration; and
variables related to the types of rationales and evidence utilized
by the decision maker when deciding for either the employee or
the employer.
The variables were intended to be "objective," such that, as put by
the authors of a previous study in another area of employment law,
"well-trained legal professionals should reach the same answers in
most cases."'14
I randomly divided the OSHA and ALJ cases among the coders for
coding. For OSHA cases, the selection of cases for each coder
included the same randomly selected 52 cases (approximately 10%
from each year) to check inter-coder reliability.l15 The coders had
95.82% agreement for their coding of variables for these overlapping
cases. The high agreement rate among coders indicates that the
coded results are reliable.l16
For ALJ cases, the coders had 90.41% agreement for their coding
of variables. After correcting for coder input errors and misunderstanding of the coding for two specific variable^,^" the coders had
93.97% agreement."' The remaining differences were interpretative,
114. See Juliano & Schwab, supm note 15,at 558.The coders for the OSHA cases were two
law students who completed their first year of study a t a law school in the midwestern United
States. The coders for the AU cases included the two OSHA coders, a recent graduate of that
same law school, and the author. I gave the student coders specific instruction on the Act's
legal requirements and trained them through repeated practice coding sessions.
115. The coders did not know which cases were included among these overlapping 52 cases.
116. See KIMBERLY A. NEUENDORF,
THECONTENT
ANALYSIS
GUIDEBOOK
143 (2002)("It's
clear from a review of the work on reliability that reliability coefficients of .90 or greater
would be acceptable to all....").
117. These coding issues are addressed more thoroughly in the detailed description of the
study's methodology, available online. See Moberly, Methodology, supra note 92.
118. An inordinate amount of the differences between the coders occurred in the six cases
in which the employee prevailed. Although these cases amounted to 2.54% of cases (6/236),
coding differences on these cases totaled 23.55% of all the differences. Coders on these six
cases had a n agreement rate of 74.87%. The most likely explanation for such a disparity on
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and these differences were resolved through discussion among the
coders. The agreed-upon coding became the data used in the study.
Again, given the high agreement rate and the discussion regarding
the few differences, the coded results for the ALJ cases are also
reliable.'lg
Before statistical analyses, I matched OSHA decisions with any
subsequent ALJ decision related to the OSHA complaint. I matched
cases using employer named2' and synchronizing key variables,
such a s filing dates, decision dates, and case numbers. After this
process, 186 cases contained both OSHA and ALJ decisions. Fortythree cases (involving 44 employees) contained information only
from ALJ opinions, while 305 cases contained information only from
OSHA decision^.'^^ Thus, the data contained information for 535
employees who filed for relief under Sarbanes-Oxley. The final data
spreadsheet contained 223 variables across the 535 employees,
ultimately yielding 119,305 cells or d a t a ~ 0 i n t s . l ~ ~
Researchers employ hypothesis-testing statistics with associated
alpha levels to infer that sample characteristics represent the
population from which the sample was drawn with a specific
probability of accuracy.123 In this study, no sampling occurred;
instead, I analyzed a complete census of cases for the time period
described above. Thus, I did not calculate and do not report
these types of cases might be that these opinions are extraordinarily long. Except for one case
in which a default judgment was entered, the opinions in the other five employee-win cases
averaged 55 pages in length. The agreement rate for all cases other than the six employee-win
cases was 95.71%.
119. See NEUENDORF,
supra note 116,a t 143.
120. I was unable to use the employee's name a s a means of matching cases because OSHA
redacted information related to the identity of the employee when OSHA responded to the
FOIA request.
121. The 43 cases with only ALJ decisions were missing OSHA decisions for one of two
reasons: either I could not reasonably link the ALJ case to a n OSHA case based upon the
method discussed above, or the ALJ case was related to a n OSHA case filed after July 13,
2005,the date of my FOIA request, and therefore would not be included in the documents
produced by OSHA. Of the 305 OSHA decisions with no corresponding ALJ opinion, 129 either
settled or withdrew a t the OSHA Level, and therefore would not have any ALJ case associated
with it. The balance of 176 cases either did not request a n ALJ hearing or the ALJ decision
had not been released by June 1,2006,the end date of the study.
122. Copies of the spreadsheets used for statistical analyses are available from the author
upon request.
123. See BERNARD
E. WHITNN,JR.,PRINCIPLES
OF RESEARCH
IN BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE42930 (2d ed. 2002).
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statistical findings with alpha levels. Instead, I report exact
statistical characteristics for the population of cases under study.lZ4
I did not include ARB decisions in the study because only a small
number of ARB opinions addressed legal or factual issues related to
Sarbanes-Oxley. As of September 30, 2006, the ARB had issued 39
Sarbanes-Oxley opinions involving review of 33 cases.lZ5Of those 39
opinions, only 13 addressed legal or factual issues related to
Sarbanes-Oxley. The other opinions addressed ARB procedural
policies or indicated that the case was either withdrawn or settled.
Of course, ARB decisions substantively affect the administrative
review process, a s the ARB'S interpretation of the Act is binding on
OSHA and the U s . Accordingly, I will discuss the impact of a n
ARB decision on a particular legal issue where appropriate.

This Part examines two types of results from the study. First, in
order to contextualize the study's explanations for why so few
employees won Sarbanes-Oxley claims, Section A provides a
statistical "big picture" view of the outcomes for all Sarbanes-Oxley
cases. Second, to explain the low employee win rate described in
Section A, Section B examines the rationales used by OSHA and the
ALJs when finding against the employee. I n this Section, I conclude
that employees rarely won because OSHA and the ALJs determined
that a large percentage of employees failed to prove a SarbanesOxley claim as a matter of law,often by narrowly construing the
Act's legal parameters. Moreover, for the cases that survived this
strict legal analysis, OSHA found that a vast majority of employees
failed to present sufficient facts to satisfy Sarbanes-Oxley's burden
of proof with regard to causation.

124. Cf.NEUENDORF, supra note 116, at 168 (arguing that content analysis to answer
research questions regarding common occurrences or themes "would probably best be
addressed with simple frequencies of occurrence and no test of statistical significance").
125. ARB cases are listed by date at USDOUOAU Reporter: Decisions of the
Administrative Review Board by Date, http:/lwww.oalj.dol.gov/PUBLIClARB/REFERENCESl
CASELISTS/ARBINDEX.HTM(last visited Sept. 22,2007).
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A. The Big Picture: Outcomes from the Administrative Process
The win rates for employees and employers in cases that fully
completed each stage of administrative review were remarkably
one-sided. As Table 1 indicates, employees won 3.6% of the cases
completed a t the OSHA Level, a n d 6.5% of the cases completed a t
the ALJ Level.
Table 1: Win Rates for Cases that Completed Each Level of
Administrative Review

Employee
Win Rate
Employer
Win Rate

OSHA
Level
3.6%
(13)8
96.4%
(348)

ALJ Level
6.5%
(6)
93.5%
(87)

NOTE: Table 1 reports the percentage of cases won by each party
when OSHA or an ALJ made a determination for either the
complainant-employee or the respondent-employer.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

Moreover, the win rate for employees a t the OSHA Level appears
to be decreasing over time. The win rate set forth in Table 1does not
include any OSHA cases filed after July 13, 2005, the end date of
the OSHA part of the study. Yet, according to preliminary statistics
released by OSHA for decisions through September 30, 2006,
employees won 3.1% of the cases decided at the OSHA Level since
' ~ ~employee won in any of the 159
Sarbanes-Oxley's e n a ~ t m e n t .No
cases OSHA resolved in Fiscal Year 2006, after the end of the
study.'''
Sarbanes-Oxley's low employee win rate, although surprising,
appears even more disproportionate when compared to win rates for
126. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
127. See id.
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employees asserting claims under statutes other than SarbanesOxley. Table 2, below, summarizes win rates for employees and
plaintiffs raising claims i n a variety of administrative and judicial
fora.
As with the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates discussed thus far, the win
rates set forth in Table 2 are for cases that completed the administrative or judicial process with a decision rendered for one of the
parties; therefore, cases that settled or were voluntarily withdrawn
are not i n c 1 ~ d e d . l ~ ~

128. I do not report the results of a test for statistical signiticance
comparing the
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2. Such a test would be inappropriate because the
descriptive statistics displayed in Table 2 are based on data gathered from diverse populations
using different sampling techniques a t divergent points in time. However, if win rates were
approximately equal across employment cases and venues from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005, we
would expect to see win rates that differed in only minor ways, regardless of the sampling
techniques. Thus, although the win rates in Table 2 may not be statistically comparable, they
provide interesting points of conceptual comparison and a contextual perspective for the
Sarbanes-Oxley win rate discussed in this Article.
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Table 2:Comparison of Win Rates for Various Types of Claims Resolved by
Administrative Agencies and Federal Courts

Discrimination
EEOC
Casesc

Disability Charges

Religious
Discrimination
Sex-Based
Charges
Equal Pay Act
Charges
Sexual
Harassment Cases
Employment
Cases
A
l
l
Non-Jobs
Court
Cases
Casesd
Torts and Contracts Cases
" All numbers in parentheses reflect
category.

(615)
9.1%
(2,972)
10.6%
(578)
10.6%
(5,343)
13.7%
(271)
14.1%
(3,255)

(7,922)
90.9%
(29,837)
89.4%
(4,858)
89.4%
(44,840)
86.3%
(1,707)
85.9%
(19,775)

13.0%

87.0%

52.9%

47.1%

62.4%

37.6%

the number of cases in each
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The Sarbanes-Oxleyresults are derived from this study's results.129
OSHA provided the other statistics to the author for Fiscal Years
2003-2005.lS0AU statistics for other statutes are not available.
'The EEOC statistics were compiled from statistics published on the
EEOC's website for Fiscal Years 2003-2005.131
The federal court statistics are from data collected by the federal
government for cases filed in federal court from 1979-2000.132
With the exception of whistleblowers under the Energy Reorganization Act, Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers succeeded at a lower rate
than a broad range of employees and other plaintiffs, regardless of
whether the employee brought a different statutory claim under
OSHA's jurisdiction, in a process administered by a n agency other
than OSHA, or as a plaintiff in federal court. For example, even
though Congress based Sarbanes-Oxley's protections upon the
provisions of AIR21, airline industry whistleblowers succeeded a t
more than twice the rate of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers (9.8%)
in OSHA i n ~ e s t i g a t i 0 n s . l ~ ~
Sarbanes-Oxley's low employee win rate should give pause.
Almost without exception, both critics and supporters of employee
rights acknowledge the employee-friendlynature of Sarbanes-Oxley,
with a burden of proof clearly intended to enhance a whistleblower's

129. See Table 1 supra.
130. See E-mailfrom Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Oct. 5,2006)(on file with author).
131. See EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/
enforcement.htm1 (last visited Sept. 22,2007). The statistics include decisions in which the
EEOC made a "reasonable cause" determination and cases in which the EEOC issued a "no
reasonable cause" determination, which together appear to include all of the cases that
resulted in a final administrative decision by the EEOC. In other words, these numbers do
not include cases that were settled or withdrawn, or cases in which the complainant requested
a "right-to-sue" letter after 180 days and thus never received a n actual finding from the EEOC
(labeled "administrative closures" on the website). See id.
132. Professors Clermont & Schwab reported these data. See Clermont & Schwab, supra
note 17,a t 429-31,457.
"Employment" cases included actions filed under Title VII, the ADA,
the ADEA, the FMLA,and employment-related claims filed under 42 U.S.C. sections 1981 or
1983.See id. a t 431.P l a i n t a w i n rates for "torts and contracts" cases were compiled from "13
sizable torts and contracts categories." Id. a t 458.The "nonjobs" cases are all federal cases
other than the "employment" cases. See id.
133. See Table 2 supra.

20071

UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS

95

chance of winning.134Despite these provisions, however, the Act fails
to produce corresponding employee victories.
It should be noted that the Sarbanes-Oxley win rates set forth in
Table 1 do not include all of the possible outcomes of a SarbanesOxley complaint filed with OSHA; Table 1 addresses only cases in
which a n administrative decision was made. Sarbanes-Oxley
complaints also could settle, be withdrawn,135or be sent to arbitration. Table 3 sets forth the percentage of cases resolved with each of
these possible outcomes a t both the OSHA and the AU levels of
review.

134. See supra text accompanying notes 8-14; see also Philip M. Berkowitz, Whistleblower
Regulations, 27 NAPLL.J., 1 (2004) (noting "the extraordinary risk [to business] that this
statute imposes"); Flahardy, supra note 14, a t 24 (quoting management attorneys who
recognize that the "burden of proof for a n employee to establish a violation is very low"
(internal quotation omitted)); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Whistle-Blower Retaliation Liability
Cascading, NAT'LUNDERWRITER, Aug. 14, 2006, a t 23-24.
135. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.114(a) (2006). Of all AU cases in which the employee withdrew
(92 observations), almost half (45, or 48.9%) declared that they were filing in federal court,
while another 5 (5.4%) stated that they intended to file a claim in state court. The data did
not provide a rationale for the withdrawal for a fairly large number of these ALJ cases: 30,
or 32.6%. At the OSHA Level, a large percentage of cases (72.2%) did not provide a reason for
the employee's withdrawal. A complete table setting forth the rationales provided by
employees who withdrew complaints can be found online. See Richard E. Moberly, Basic Data
for Unfulfilled Expectations Article, tbl.J, http://www.wm.edullawlpublicationsflawreviewl
documents/basic-data.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2007) [hereinafter Moberly, Basic Data].
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Table 3:Outcomes of OSHA and ALJ Review
Outcome

OSHA Level
1

vn n n /

Employer Win

I

Employee Win

I

I

ALJ Level
37.8%
2.6%

(13)
. ,
14.7%
(72)
11.6%

.,

40.0%
Employee Withdrawal
(92)
18.3%
Settlement
(57)
(42)
0.2%
1.3%
Arbitrati~n'~~
(1)
(3)
.,
.,
100.0%
100.0%
Total
(491)
(230)
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

As Table 3 demonstrates, almost three-fourths of cases a t the
OSHA Level (73.5%) received a determination either for the
employee or the employer. ALJs, however, resolved dramatically
fewer of the cases filed (40.4%)because more employees settled or
withdrew their claims. Although the study focused on the cases that
fully completed each stage of the administrative process, the
settlements and withdrawals certainly impacted the types of cases
left to be resolved by administrative decision makers.
The extent of this impact is difficult to determine. Settlement of
a case may provide some indication that the case had a t least
minimal merit and therefore arguably could be counted a s a n
employee success. Indeed, settlements may have removed the
strongest employee cases from the pool of cases, causing the
employee win rate in resolved cases to appear lower than the
136. Because of arbitration agreements in employment contracts, these cases either were
ordered to arbitration or the parties agreed that arbitration was the more appropriate forum.
As demonstrated by Table 3, arbitration issues had little impact because cases were seldom
sent to arbitration--only once a t the OSHA Level of review and three times by an ALJ.This
seemingly low number could be the result of a n early federal court decision that required a
Sarbanes-Oxley plaintiff to arbitrate a Sarbanes-Oxley claim, which could have influenced
employees with arbitration agreements to not attempt to file their claims administratively.
See Boss v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 684,685(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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number of "meritorious" claims actually filed.13' On the other hand,
given the higher settlement rate a t the ALJ Level than a t the OSHA
Level, a settlement may simply reflect a n employer's increased
willingness to enter "nuisance-value" settlements rather than pay
the high litigation costs of a n ALJ hearing.13' Or employers may
have settled a case involving allegations of corporate fraud to avoid
bad publicity, even if the allegations were without merit.13'
The settlement rate for Sarbanes-Oxley cases appears similar to
the settlement rate for claims before the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the other primary administrative
forum for employment claims. EEOC claims settled a t approximately the same rate-14.7% from Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005-as
Sarbanes-Oxley OSHA cases.l4' Both of these settlement rates pale
in comparison to the settlement rate for cases once they reach the
court system. For example, scholars estimate that more than 60%
of cases filed in federal court settle each year.141 As indicated by
Table 3, Sarbanes-Oxley cases settled a t a much lower rate: 11.6%
137. In fact, OSHAcomputes its percentage of "merit"reso1utions by combiningsettlements
with employee wins. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative
Assistance, to author (Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
138. The study's results support this inference because 16.9% of employer wins a t the
OSHA Level settle after the win, which is higher than the settlement rate before the OSHA
decision in the employer's favor. Another explanation for this settlement rate, however, is that
employees may be more willing to settle after losing a t the OSHA Level. See Moberly, Basic
Data, supra note 135, a t tb1.B.
139. Some anecdotal evidence of this phenomenon exists in the Sarbanes-Oxley context.
See Judy Greenwald, Whistleblower Retaliation Claims Challenging Employers, 39 Bus. INS.
4 (2005) ("Some observers say fear of being associated with a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower
suit is leading some employers to settle even when they feel the claim has no merit. 'They fear
the potential bad publicity,' said James S. Urban, a n attorney with Jones Day in Pittsburgh.");
see also Michael R. Triplett, Uncertainty About Parameters of SOX Claims Creates Challenges
for Lawyers on Both Sides, 4 WORKPLACE
L. REP.482, 482 (2006), available a t http://pubs.
bna.com/ip/bna/whl.nsffeh/aOb2q6pOv8(reporting that a management attorney claims
employers have a clear incentive to settle Sarbanes-Oxley cases before entering the
administrative review process because of the types of complaints Sarbanes-Oxley
whistleblowers lodge and the high-level positions often held by whistleblowers).
140. I calculated this settlement rate from statistics published on the EEOC website by
dividing the number of settlements and withdrawals with benefits (36,781 observations) by
the total number of resolutions during Fiscal Years 2003 to 2005 (250,366 observations). See
EEOC, All Statutes, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
141. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 100, a t 136 (noting that 66.7% of all federal
civil cases terminated during fiscal year 2000 settled); Parker, supra note 15, a t 904, 912
(finding a settlement rate of 67% in study of race and national origin discrimination cases in
two federal district courts in 2002).
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at the OSHA Level and 18.3% a t the ALJ Leve1.1d2This lower rate
may indicate that parties were less willing to settle in the early
years of Sarbanes-Oxley, perhaps because the parties lacked
certainty regarding the possible breadth of OSHA's and the ALJs'
interpretations of the scope of the Act. On the other hand, given the
similar settlement rate for EEOC claims, Sarbanes-Oxley's settlement rate may reflect a more general reluctance of parties to settle
in a n administrative forum rather t h a n in a court case.
The ambiguity of the settlement data in the study conceals the
full meaning of a Sarbanes-Oxley settlement a s it relates to the
employee win rate.ld3Do settlements provide employees relief comparable to wins? I t is M i c u l t to say whether a settlement should be
counted a s a n employee "win," given that both sides inevitably
compromise their claims when they settle.ld4Unfortunately, OSHA
and the OALJ refuse to release data that could provide insight into
this issue: the amount paid in settlement costs.ld5
Similarly, employee withdrawals have uncertain meaning in this
context. One assumption may be t h a t employees with strong cases
withdrew from the administrative process to file in federal court,
with the hope of obtaining a large damage award from a jury. Yet,
the study's results demonstrate t h a t 41% of the cases that employers won at the OSHA Level were withdrawn by employees before a n
AU decision could be reached.ld6Moreover, a substantial number
of cases that withdrew likely had little or no merit; either employees
withdrew without asserting any reason for their withdrawal (72.2%
at the OSHA Level and 32.6% a t the ALJ Level), or they withdrew
after admitting that a prima facie case of retaliation could not be
proven (2.8% and 6.5%), or for some other reason, such a s admitting
- -

-

-

-

-

--

142. See Table 3 supra.
143. Cf. Colker, Winning,supra note 15,a t 256 (''It is hard to categorize settlements as proplaintiff or pro-defendant since plaintiffs typically settle for less than they seek in litigation.");
Parker, supra note 15,a t 910 (''[A] settlement can't be defined as either a win or a loss.").
144. See Parker, supra note 15,a t 909.
145. The Department of Labor regulations require that OSHA or the OALJ approve
Sarbanes-Oxley settlement agreements. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.11l(d)(l)-(d)(2) (2006).Through
the Freedom of Information Act, I requested information from OSHA and the OALJ related
to these settlements, but this request had not been fully resolved by the time of this Article's
publication.
146. A complete table setting forth the outcome a t the ALJ Level of cases in which the
employer won a t the OSHA Level can be found in Moberly, Basic Data,supra note 135,a t
tb1.B.
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that they misunderstood the purpose of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act or
determined that further litigation expenses were not warranted
(5.6% and 6.5%).14' Thus, a reasonable conclusion may be that
employees with weaker cases withdrew. These withdrawals could
have depleted the pool of strong employer cases, meaning that the
employee win rate might have been even lower had these cases not
been withdrawn.
Ultimately, the data presently available regarding SarbanesOxley settlements and withdrawals do not provide definitive
answers regarding the objective merit of either the overall pool of
cases or the cases that receive administrative decision^.'^^ Thus, we
do not know, and cannot determine, whether employees filed "good"
or "%ad" Sarbanes-Oxley cases.14'
However, the employee win rate presented in Table 1is meaningful if combined with a n analysis of the types of decisions made by
OSHA and the ALJs when resolving Sarbanes-Oxley claims. The
manner in which OSHA and the ALJs reached their decisions
provides some explanation for this unexpectedly low employee win
rate. Thus, the balance of this Part empirically examines how OSHA
and the AUs resolved so many cases in favor of employers and
against employees.

147. See id. a t tb1.J.
148. If settlements and withdrawals are included in calculations regarding employee
success rate, then the numbers change dramatically. Employee wins and settlements
combined are 14.2% of all OSHA cases filed, and 20.9% of all ALJ filings. See Table 3 supra.
If withdrawals and arbitrations are excluded because they did not complete the process, then
the employee wins and settlements combined are 16.7% of the remaining OSHA cases filed,
and 35.6% of the remaining ALJ cases. See id.
149. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
L. REV.
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL
581, 588-89 (1998) (explaining that inferences from win rates to generalizations about the
types of cases being filed can be dangerous). Similarly, little can be inferred from the results
of this study regarding the overall effect of Sarbanea-Oxley in the workplace, such a s whether
more or less whistleblowing or more or less retaliation occurs, a s these concerns lie beyond
the scope of the present study. This study does not examine the overall pool of potential
Sarbanes-Oxley cases, only the actual pool of such cases filed with OSHA. See id. a t 589
(''[Tlhe case-selection effect theory holds that win rates reveal something about the set of
adjudged cases, and not much about the underlying mass of disputes and cases.").
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B. Explaining the Low Win Rate: The Importance of Procedural,
Boundary, and Causation Hurdles
A Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower must overcome a series of
hurdles in order to prevail in either a n OSHA investigation or a n
ALJ hearing. Failure to surmount any of these hurdles will result
in a n employer victory.
First, procedural hurdles require that the employee take action
in a timely manner. The retaliation must have occurred after the
effective date of the Act,150 the complaint must be filed within 90
days of the retaliation,151 and any appeal must be filed within 30
days of a n OSHA decision.15' When OSHA or a n ALJ makes a
decision in favor of a n employer because the employee failed to
overcome one of these hurdles, the study identified that decision as
using a "procedural rationale."
Second, a n employee must demonstrate that the claim is within
the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley. The whistleblower must be a
covered employee,153work for a covered employer,154engage in a
covered ("protected") activity,155 and suffer a covered adverse

150. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2003-SOX-23 ( A U
Jan. 16, 2004); Kunkler v. Global Futures & Forex, Ltd., 2003-SOX-6 (ALJApr. 24, 2003);
Gilmore v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 2003-SOX-1 ( A U Feb. 6, 2003). Even if the protected
activity occurred before the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley, a whistleblower claim could be
based on retaliation that occurred after the effective date. See, e.g., Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc.,
2003-SOX-8, a t 15 (AkJ Feb. 2, 2004).
151. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(b)(2)@) (Supp. IV 2004).
152. See 29 C.F.R. $ 1980.105(c) (2006).
153. A U s consistently have not permitted workers in a foreign country to assert claims
under Sarbanes-Oxley. See, e.g., Ede v. Swatch Group, 2004-SOX-68,a t 2 ( A U Jan. 14,2005);
Concone v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 2005-SOX-6, a t 2 (AkJ Dec. 3,2004).
154. See 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004) (prohibiting retaliation by any "company
with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. $ 78L), or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. $ 780(d))").
155. Not only must the employee complain about a n illegal activity covered by SarbanesOxley, but the employee also must reasonably believe that the activity is covered by SarbanesOxley. See id. 5 1514A(a)(l). Although there is some dispute, the ARB recently determined
that the "reasonable belief' issue presents a legal question to be resolved by a judge. See
Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., No. 05-064, a t 10 (ARB May 31, 2007); see also Jarod
S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment: Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & E m . L. 25, 76 (2006) (arguing for
this result).
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employment a ~ t i 0 n . If
l ~a~n employer won because a n employee's
claim fell outside of these boundaries, then OSHA or the ALJ used
a "boundary rationale."
Third, a decision maker will evaluate the factual merits of the
case only after the employee has satisfied all the procedural rules
and has demonstrated that the complaint is within the boundaries
of Sarbanes-Oxley. At that point, an employee must overcome
causation hurdles by convincing the decision maker that the
employer knew about the whistleblower's protected activity, and
that this activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employment action.15' If the employee proves causation, the employer may
still attempt to demonstrate by "clear and convincing" evidence that
it would have made the same employment decision absent any
protected activity.15' AS with the other two hurdles, if a n employer
won because a n employee failed to show causation or because the
employer satisfied its clear and convincing burden of proof, then the
case can be thought of a s being decided by a "causation rationale."
The procedural and boundary rationales often involved decisions
made as a matter of law-that is, with few or no factual disputes. By
contrast, the causation rationale more frequently involved disputed
factual issues that a decision maker must resolve.
The low win rate for employees (and corresponding high win rate
for employers) can be explained, a t least in part, by examining the
effect of these hurdles on a n employee's case.
1. The Size of the Hurdle Depended on the Level of Review

The three categories of rationales set forth above contain 11
different grounds on which a decision against a n employee may rest;
one or more was cited in almost every case a n employer won.15'
156. Sarbanes-Oxley states it is unlawful for a covered employer to "discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against a n employee in the
terms and conditions of employment" because the employee engaged in protected activity. 18
U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
157. See discussion supra Part 1.B (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley's burdens of proof).
158. See id.; cf. Gonzalez, supra note 155, a t 81 (arguing that, in cases removed to federal
court, a "SOX jury's main role as the fact finder is to resolve the issue of causation").
159. A twelfth, "othe? category can also be found in the cases. Of the 337 employer-win
OSHA cases in which a rationale was discernable, 15 included a rationale other than one of
the 11 set out in Table 4. Nine of these 15 simply stated that an employee's prima facie case
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Table 4 presents the percentage of employer wins in which OSHA
or an ALJ utilized each of these rationales.
Table 4: Rationales Used When an Employer Wins

Employment Action Not "Adverse"
No Reasonable Belief

Causation

No Employer Knowledge of
Protected Activity
Protected Activity Not a
"Contributing Factor" in Adverse Employment Action
Employer Satisfied "Clear
and Convincing" Standard on
Rebuttal

11.1%
(36)
5.6%
(18)
5.9%
(19)

9.6%
(8)
14.5%
(12)
2.4%
(2)

35.5%
(115)

21.7%
(18)

11.7%
(38)

14.5%
(12)

NOTE: The percentages do not total 100%because OSHA and the
U s often provided more than one rationale when deciding a case.
The percentages used in Table 4 are based on the number of cases in
which coders could identify a specific rationale divided by the number
~~~

was not satisfied, but did not specify which elements were not met. Of the 87 such cases at
the ALJ Level, five included this "other" rationale.
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of cases in which coders could identify any rationale. Of the 348 cases
in favor of the employer at the OSHA Level, a rationale (other than
the "other" category) was discernable in 324. Accordingly, 324 is used
a s the denominator for Table 4's percentages. Of the 87 employer-win
cases a t the ALJ Level, 83 had discernable rationales (other than the
"other" category) and therefore that number is used as the denominator.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

A pattern develops when these rationales are ordered by categories. The data displayed in Table 5 demonstrate that OSHA and the
ALJs decided cases in favor of employers by utilizing somewhat
different rationales.
Table 5: Rationale Used in Cases Decided in Favor of Employer
OSHA Level

ALJ Level

Procedural
Rationale

21.0% of cases
(68)"

39.8%
(33)

Boundary
Rationale

49.7%
(161)

67.5%
(56)

Causation
Rationale

45.4%
(147)

24.1%
(20)

Difference
1.89 times
more likely
a t ALJ Level
1.36 times
more likely
at ALJ Level
1.88times
more likely
a t OSHA
Level

NOTE: In Table 5, the percentages do not total 100%because OSHA
and the ALJs often provided more than one type of rationale when
deciding a case. As with Table 4, the percentages used in Table 5 are
based on the number of cases in which coders identified a specific
rationale divided by the number of cases in which coders identified
any rationale: 324 OSHA cases and 83 ALJ cases.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.
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At both levels of review, OSHA and the ALJs resolved a substantial number of cases in favor of the employer a s a matter of law, by
using either a procedural or a boundary rationale. Although ALJs
used both rationales more frequently than OSHA, decision makers
a t both levels of review relied heavily on a legal analysis of a
Sarbanes-Oxley claim prior to, or instead of, resolving any causation
disputes.
At t h e OSHA Level, however, causation rationales played a n
important role a s well. OSHA used one of the three causation
rationales a s part of the case's determination in almost half of the
cases (45.4%). Indeed, OSHA used a specific causation rationale
-finding that the employee failed to demonstrate that the protected
activity was a "contributing factor" in the adverse employment
action-more frequently than any other single rationale. Over 35%
of the cases decided in favor of the employer utilized this specific
rationale, either alone or in combination with other rati0na1es.l~~
By contrast, ALJs tended to resolve cases with one of the
procedural or boundary rationales by determining that SarbanesOxley did not cover the employee's allegations. I n all cases decided
in favor of the employer, ALJs provided a causation rationale 24.1%
of the time.l6' Interestingly, in these cases, ALJs most often utilized
a causation rationale in conjunction with one of the other two
types of rationales. Of the 20 cases in which ALJs used a causation
rationale, only 4 (20%) were decided solely based on that type of
rati0na1e.l~~
I n the other 16 cases, a causation rationale was used i n
conjunction with one or both of the other two types of rati0na1es.l~~
Thus, even when ALJs addressed the causal elements of a case, they
typically did so only when also deciding the case as a matter of law
with a procedural or boundary rationale. U s , explicitly or
implicitly, utilized the lawyerly "even if ..." argument to address
causation issues only a s a backstop to other arguments.la ALJs
relied solely on a causation rationale in only 4 of the 83 cases they
160. See Table 4 supra.
161. See Table 5 supra.
162. See Moberly,Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C. By contrast, of the 147 cases decided
by OSHA using a causation rationale, OSHA cited only the causation rationale in 108 (73.5%)
of these decisions. Id. OSHA utilized the causation rationale in conjunction with one or both
of the other rationales in 39 cases (26.5%).Id.
163. Id.
164. See Table 4 supra.
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decided in favor of the employer (4.8%), meaning that ALJs decided
cases a s a matter of law over 95% of the time.165By comparison,
OSHA relied solely on causation issues 33.3% of the time.166In
short, OSHA was almost seven times more likely than a n ALJ to
cite causation issues a s determinative.
This difference in emphasis impacted the outcomes of cases a s
they progressed through the administrative process. The data in
Table 6 reveal that A U s typically upheld OSHA decisions when
those decisions were based upon procedural or boundary grounds.
However, when a causation rationale formed the basis of OSHA's
decision, ALJs scrutinized those cases again for legal deficiencies,
particularly boundary issues. Given that the ALJ review is de novo,
one expects a review of the same issues examined a t the OSHA
Level. Nonetheless, ALJs appear more likely to decide cases on
procedural or boundary grounds, even if OSHA already utilized a
causation rationale.
Table 6:Rationales Used for Employer Wins at Each Level

ALJ
Procedural
OSHA
Procedural
OSHA
Boundary
OSHA
Causation

64.0%

(16)"
19.0%
(8)
10.0%
(3)

ALJ
Boundary
28.0%
(7)
64.3%
(27)

46.7%
(14)

ALJ
Causation
8.0%
(2)
16.7.%
(7)
43.3%

(13)

Total

100.0%
(25)
100.0%
(42)
100.0%
(30)

NOTE: The numbers in Table 6 do not equal the total number of
employer-wincases at the ALJ Level because more than one rationale
could be coded for each case. The numbers in bold represent consistent decision making across both levels.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.
165. See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C. Again, note that 4 of the 87
employer-wincases did not have a discernable rationale (other than the "other"category) and
therefore were not included in this calculation. See note accompanying Table 4 supra.
166. Of the 324 cases that were decided for the employer at the OSHA Level and from
which a rationale could be discerned (other than the "other"category), OSHA utilized only a
causation rationale in 108 cases. See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.C.
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This pattern of decision making effectively prevented employees
from obtaining a n ALJ hearing on the merits of whether their
whistleblowing caused their adverse employment action. ALJs held
factual hearings in only 28% of the cases in which a n ALJ rendered
~~
having a hearing before a n ALJ did not
a d e ~ i s i 0 n . lMoreover,
guarantee that the ALJ evaluated the causation elements of a case.
In over half (58.6%) of the 29 cases in which a n ALJ held a factual
hearing, the ALJ decided the case on boundary g r 0 ~ n d s . l ~ ~
I n sum, Sarbanes-Oxley cases endured two rigorous filtering
systems a s they advanced through the administrative process.
First, both OSHA and the ALJs rejected cases based on procedural
and boundary rationales. Second, even if a case survived OSHA's
stringent legal evaluation, OSHA also rejected a large percentage
of cases because the employee failed to prove causation (that is,
that the employer knew about the employee's protected activity and
that the employee's whistleblowing was a contributing factor in a n
employer's adverse employment action) or because the employer
satisfied its "clear and convincing" burden. Interestingly, ALJs
typically upheld OSHA determinations for the employer, but in so
doing, ALJs utilized legal rather t h a n causation rationales. ALJs
rarely relied on a causation determination alone to resolve
Sarbanes-Oxley claims.

2. Specific Legal Hurdles Loomed Large
OSHA and the ALJs focused on three legal rationales when
deciding in favor of the employer: one procedural, and two related
to Sarbanes-Oxley's boundaries. As detailed below, the administrative focus on these three issues often led to narrow interpretations
of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal parameters that negatively impacted
employees' claims.

167. ALJs held hearings in 26 out of the 93 cases in which ALJs rendered a decision. See
id. at tb1.D.
168. When ALJs held a hearing, they resolved the case using a procedural rationale 6.9%
of the time (2 observations); a boundary rationale 58.6%of the time (17 observations); and a
causation rationale 58.6%of the time (17 observations). See id. at tb1.E. These percentages
total more than 100%because ALJs often used more than one rationale.
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a. Statute of Limitations
Both OSHA and the ALJs focused intently on whether the
employee filed a Sarbanes-Oxley claim within the Act's 90-day
statute of limitations. In approximately one-third (33.8%)of the ALJ
cases decided in favor of the employer, ALJs found that the
employee failed to file a claim within 90 days.16' OSHA utilized this
rationale in 18.8% of cases it decided in favor of the e m p 1 0 ~ e r . l ~ ~
Despite this seeming difference between OSHA and the U s , both
levels of review often found violations of the statute of limitations
in the same cases, indicating a similar focus by both sets of decision
makers. OSHA used this rationale i n 72.2% of the ALJ cases that
also found a statute of limitations violation.171
I n many cases, administrative decision makers have little or no
discretion regarding enforcement of the statute of limitations; the
Act is clear regarding the 90-day limitations period. Moreover, the
Department of Labor's regulations clarify that the 90-day filing
window begins when a n employee h a s knowledge of an adverse
employment action, not when the action actually occurred.172
Accordingly, these clear rules require that OSHA and ALJs reject
complaints when employees fail to file within 90 days of the notice
of a n adverse action, even if the adverse action actually occurred
within 90 days of the filing of the c0mp1aint.l~~
However, OSHA and the ALJs also strictly enforced the statute
of limitations in cases in which discretion could be utilized to excuse
a n employee's late filing. For example, OSHA and ALJs consistently
rebuffed employees' claims that the statute of limitations should
169. See Table 4 supra.
170. See id.
171. The study obtained data on the OSHA result in 18 of the 28 ALJ statute of limitations
cases, and OSHA also concluded that the statute of limitations was not met in 13 of those 18
cases (72.2%), indicating that OSHA also seems to focus on the statute of limitations issue.
The other 10 cases were cases in which a n ALJ opinion was available, but no OSHA opinion
was included in the production of cases in response to my FOIA request. Thus, it may be that
statute of limitations cases are appealed to U s a t a higher rate, which would account for
the more frequent use of the statute of limitations rationale a t the ALJ Level.
172. See Procedures, supra note 59, a t 52,106.
173. See, e.g., Lawrence v. AT&T Labs, 2004-SOX-65, a t 5 (ALJ Sept. 9, 2004); Halpern v.
XL Capital, Ltd., 2004-SOX-54, a t 3 (AWJune 7, 2004); Letter from Marthe B. Kent, Reg'l
Adm'r, OSHA (Oct. 2, 2003) (on file with author); Letter from Adam M. Finkel, Reg'l Adm'r,
OSHA, to Michelle R. Kestler (Feb. 3,2003) (on file with author).
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be tolled or not enforced for equitable reasons. Equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations typically is permitted when a n employee
is unable, despite due diligence, to gain information necessary to
Similarly, equitable estoppel prevents
file a timely c0mp1aint.l~~
enforcement of the statute of limitations because the employer
Neither
stopped the employee from filing a timely c0mp1aint.l~~
equitable argument has had much success in Sarbanes-Oxley
cases.176For example, in one ALJ case the parties agreed that while
they explored settlement options, the employee would not file a
Sarbanes-Oxley claim and the employer would not assert a statute
of limitations defense.177As a result, the employee ultimately filed
a complaint outside of the limitations ~ e r i 0 d .The
l ~ ~ALJ rejected the
application of equitable tolling or estoppel principles and dismissed
the case for failure to file within the limitations period, despite the
parties' agreement to the contrary.17'
Administrative decision makers equitably tolled the statute of
limitations in only one case. In a case brought against Southwest
Securities very early in the life of the Act, both OSHA and a n ALJ
permitted a pro se employee to pursue a claim even though she
missed the deadline by two days.lS0The employee had attempted
to file her complaint with various governmental agencies other
174. See Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000).
175. See id. a t 1176.
176. See, e.g., Levi v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 2006-SOX-37, a t 22-23 (ALJ May 3,2006);
Guy v. SBC Global Servs., 2005-SOX-113, a t 3-4 (AW Dec. 14,2005); Letter from Marthe B.
Kent, Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with author); Letter from Marthe B. Kent,
Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA @ec. 7,2004) (on fde with author).
177. See Szymonik v. TyMetrix, Inc., 2006-SOX-50, a t 2 (AW Mar. 8, 2006).
178. See id. a t 1-2.
179. See id. a t 5. Although ARB decisions are not included in this study, it should be noted
that the ARB follows a similarly rigid line. Prior to October 1, 2006, employees requested
equitable tolling either of the statute of limitations or of a n appeal's filing deadline in six
Sarbanes-Oxley cases before the ARB. The Board refused such requests in every case. Carter
v. Champion Bus, Inc., No. 05-076, a t 1-2 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006); Lotspeich v. Starke Meml
Hosp., No. 05-072, a t 4 (ARB July 31,2006); Harvey v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 04-114,
a t 17 (ARB June 2,2006); Moldauer v. Canandaigua Wine Co., No. 04-022, a t 1(ARB Dec. 30,
2005); Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., No. 04-120, a t 5 (ARB Aug. 31,2005); Minkina v. Affiliated
Physicians Group, No. 05-074, a t 2 (ARB July 29,2005). The Board also denied an employer's
request for equitable tolling of the deadline for f h g a cross-appeal in the one case involving
such a request from the employer. See Henrich v. EcoLab, Inc., No. 05-036, a t 1 , 6 (ARB Mar.
31,2005).
180. See Getman v. Sw. Sec., Inc., 2003-SOX-8, a t 29 n.2 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004); Letter from
Patricia K. Clark, Reg'l Adm'r, OSHA, a t 2 (Feb. 12, 2003) (on file with author).

20071

UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS

109

than OSHA prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, but
did not file with OSHA until after the limitations period had
run.18' Under these unique circumstances, both OSHA and the ALJ
determined that her efforts to file her claim in the wrong forum
equitably tolled the limitations period.182This case stands out for
another reason besides the application of the equitable tolling
doctrine: the employee ultimately won her claim,'83 making her one
of only thirteen employees at the OSHA Level and one of only six
employees a t the AW Level to emerge v i c t o r i ~ u s . I' ~t is
~ intriguing
to consider how many other claims might have been valid but for the
mistake of filing after the limitations deadline.
b. Covered Employers

ALJs, and to a lesser extent OSHA, also focused on whether the
respondent was a "covered employer'' under Sarbanes-Oxley. ALJs
decided 28.9% of their cases in favor of respondents because the Act
failed to cover the employer.185By comparison, OSHA decided 15.4%
of its cases with this rationale.lE6 When a n ALJ found that the
respondent was not a "covered employer," the corresponding opinion
from OSHA used this rationale less than half of the time (42.1%).ls7
ALJs found that the employer was not the type of company covered
by Sarbanes-Oxley a t a much higher rate than OSHA and often in
cases in which OSHA did not focus on that issue.
The difference between OSHA and the ALJs when evaluating the
"covered employer'' issue seems to result from ambiguity in the Act's
statutory language. The Act provides that:
No company with a class of securities registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 4 781),or
181. See Getman, 2003-SOX-8,29at n.2.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 19. The ARB later overturned her victory for an unrelated reason. See
Getman v. Sw. Sec., No. 04-059 (ARB July 29,2005).
184. See Table 1 supra.
185. See Table 4 supra.
186. See id.
187. Twenty-four ALJ cases used this rationale. See Table 4 supra. The study included
OSHA data for 19 of those 24 cases. In those 19 cases, OSHA also utilized the "not a covered
employer"rationale in 8 cases (42.1%).

.'
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that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.5 780(d)), or any officer,
employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company,
may [retaliate] against a n employee in the terms and conditions
of employment because of any lawful act done by the
employee.188

The Act clearly covers employees of publicly traded companies, or in
other words, companies that have a class of securities registered
under section 12 or that are required to file reports under section
15.lS9 Determining whether a company is publicly traded or
privately held is relatively straightforward: either a respondent
meets one of these two definitions or it does not.lgOAccordingly, it
seems logical that OSHA and the ALJs would make this finding a t
relatively equivalent rates, which they did. OSHA found a company
was "privately held" in 64% of the cases in which OSHA cited the
"covered employer" rationale, while ALJs made this finding in 58.3%
of the relevant cases.lgl
However, the statutory language does not clearly set forth
whether the Act applies to privately held subsidiaries of publicly
traded companies. The ALJs focused on this ambiguity much more
intensely than OSHA. In 41.7% of ALJ cases using the "not a
covered employer" rationale, ALJs found that a n employer was not
covered by the Act because it was a subsidiary of either a publicly
traded company or a foreign company.lg2By contrast, OSHA made
this same determination a t about one-fourth the rate, 10%.lg3Thus,
the difference in usage of the "covered employer" rationale between
188. 18 U.S.C. 8 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004) (emphasis added).
189. See id.
190. See id. Perhaps not surprisingly, disputes on the borderline of this issue have arisen.
See Flake v. New World Pasta Co., No. 03-126, a t 2 (ARB Feb. 25, 2004) (finding that
respondent was not covered under the Act because its registration statement was
automatically suspended when its shares were held by less than 300 people); Stalcup v.
Sonoma Coll., 2005-SOX-114, a t 6 (ALJ Feb. 7, 2006) (finding that respondent which filed
registration statement that had not yet become effective was not covered by the Act); Roulett
v. Am. Capital Access, 2004-SOX-9, a t 7-8 (ALJ Dec. 22, 2004) (finding company that
withdrew request for registration was not covered).
191. A complete table setting forth the types of companies OSHA and the ALJs found were
not "covered employers" can be found a t Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t tb1.G.
192. See id.
193. See id.
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OSHA and the ALJs seems best explained by the difference in how
these administrative decision makers evaluated private subsidiaries
of public companies.
The subsidiary issue arises in Sarbanes-Oxley cases because the
Act prohibits discrimination by "any officer, employee, contractor,
subcontractor, or agent" of publicly traded companies.lg4Early conflicts in ALJ interpretations of this phrase a s it relates to whether
Sarbanes-Oxley covers privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded
corporations may have caused differing levels of enforcement by
ALJs and OSHA. Soon after the Act's enactment, a n ALJ interpreted this phrase broadly to mean that employees of privately
held subsidiaries were protected by the Act, particularly if the
employee named the publicly traded parent a s a respondent.lg6
Other ALJs permitted employees of privately held subsidiaries to
bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims because the employee specifically
alleged that the publicly held parent company was involved in the
retaliationlS6or that the subsidiary was a "mere instrumentality" of
the public corp~ration.'~'All of these findings occurred before
September 2004.1g8
These early and relatively broad interpretations of the Act's
"covered employer" provision may have influenced OSHA's reluctance to rely on this rationale in finding for the employer. However,
beginning in late 2004 and early 2005, ALJ opinions consistently
demonstrated a stricter reading of this provision. Some U s held
that employees of privately held subsidiaries could not bring a
Sarbanes-Oxley claim at a11.1g9Others rejected claims because the
employee did not specifically name the publicly traded parent a s a
respondent, and ALJs refused to allow the employee to amend the
complaint.200Many ALJs required that a n employee either pierce
194. 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
195. See Morefield v. Exelon Sews., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t 2-3 ( A U Jan. 28, 2004).
196. Gonzalez v. Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-39, a t 3 ( A U Aug. 20, 2004).
197. Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, a t 19 (ALJApr. 30, 2004).
198. See supra notes 195-97.
199. See Grant v. Dominion E. Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, a t 33 ( A U Mar. 10, 2005).
200. See Bothwell v. Am. Income Life, 2005-SOX-57, a t 7 ( A U Sept. 19, 2005); see also
Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2003-AIR-12, a t 4 (ALJ Mar. 5, 2003). Recently, the ARB
found that publicly traded parent companies did not need to be named a s a respondent in
order for an employee of a privately held subsidiary to bring a Sarbanes-Oxley claim. See
Klopfenstein v. PCC Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149, a t 2, 15 (ARB May 31, 2006)
(noting that subsidiary was agent of the parent).
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the corporate veil between the subsidiary and the parent201 or
demonstrate that the publicly traded parent company participated
in the adverse employment action.202
The ALJs' focus on the "covered employer" issue, and the
subsequent narrowing of the scope of this statutory provision,
seem to have affected OSHA. Although the cumulative results
from the study indicate a difference between OSHA and the ALJs in
the use of the "not a covered employer" rationale compared to other
rationales,203any distinction between ALJs and OSHA regarding
enforcement of this covered employer requirement occurred primarily in the first few years after the statute's enactment.
Chart 1: OSHA Decisions Finding That Respondent Was Not a Covered
Employer
OSHA Found Respondent Was Not a Covered Employer

Quarter and Year

I

201. See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57,
a t 8-9;Dawkins v. Shell Chem., LP, 2005-SOX-41,
at 4
(ALJ May 16,2005);Hughart v. Raymond James & Assocs., Inc., 2004-SOX-9,
a t 44 (AW Dec.
17,2004);cf. Powers v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 2003-AIR-12,
a t 4 (ALJ Mar. 5,2003)(earlier
case).
202. See Bothwell, 2005-SOX-57,
a t 9;see also Hughart, 2004-SOX-9,
a t 44 (extending
liability to parent only in area where "parent has exerted its influence or control"). In May
2006,the ARB adopted similarly restrictive interpretations of the Act by permitting a claim
against a privately held subsidiary, but only because the employee specifically demonstrated
that the subsidiary acted as a n agent of the publicly traded parent company when the
subsidiary fired the employee. See Klopfenstein, No. 04-149,a t 15.The ARB found sigmficant
the fact that the subsidiary and the parent had overlapping officers and that the person who
made the decision to fire the whistleblower sewed as a n officer of both the subsidiary
employer and the parent company. See id.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86;see also Table 4 supra.

20071

UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS

113

OSHA may have responded to the more recent and numerous ALJ
decisions narrowing the scope of this boundary issue. As indicated
in Chart 1, in the first two years of Sarbanes-Oxley decisions,
OSHA found that the respondent was not a "covered employer" in
a total of 23 cases.204In the first three quarters of 2005 alone,
however, OSHA made this finding 25 times.'05 This upward trend in
OSHA's use of the "not a covered employer" rationale may reflect
the attention OSHA pays to ALJ opinions regarding the definitional
boundaries of the Act. As of the end of the time period covered by
the study, it seems fair to conclude that both OSHA and the ALJs
focused intensively on whether the named employer was "covered"
by Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory definition.
c. Protected Activity

OSHA and the ALJs focused on a third legal question: whether
the employee engaged in "protected activity" covered by SarbanesOxley. The Act protects only whistleblowers who disclose violations
of one or more of six specifh types of laws, rules, or regulations.
Specifically, in order to be protected, a n employee must disclose
conduct that the employee reasonably believes constitutes a
violation of:
1. 18 U.S.C. 5 1341 (mail fraud);
2. 18 U.S.C. 5 1343 (wire fraud);
3. 18 U.S.C. 5 1344 (banking fraud);
4. 18 U.S.C. 5 1348 (securities fraud);
5. Any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission; or
6. Any provision of federal law relating to fraud against

shareholder^.^'^
I n 24.1%of the cases in which ALJs found in favor of the employer,
ALJs determined that the employee did not engage in protected
activity because the whistleblower's disclosure did not relate to one

204. See Chart 1 supra. A complete table setting forth the use of the "not a covered
employer"rationale over time can be found at Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.F.
205. See id.
206. See 18 U.S.C. 5 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004).
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of these statutorily defined illegal activities.207OSHA relied on this
rationale in 18.2% of the cases in which the employer prevailed.208
Employees alleged certain protected activities far more frequently
than others. Table 7, infra,sets forth the types of protected conduct
alleged by employees, including allegations that relate specifically
to the protected conduct set forth in the statutes as well as other
types of conduct.

207. See Table 4 supra.
208. See

id.

'
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Table 7: Type of Protected Activity Alleged When the "No Protected
Activity" Rationale is Used Compared to the Overall Pool of Cases
Protected Activity
(Type of Illegal
Activity Disclosed by
Whistleblower)
Banking Fraud
(§ 1344)
Securities
Fraud
(9 1348)
Mail / Wire
Fraud
($5 1341 1 1343)
Violation of
SEC Rules and
Regs
Federal Law
Relating to
Shareholder
Fraud
Fraud

I

Accounting
Fraud

Other

I

All
OSHA
Cases

"NPA"
Rationale
Used OSHA

1.4%
(6)"

3.5%
(2)

2.7%
(5)

0.0%
(0)

3.6%
(15)

1.8%
(1)

4.8%
(9)

0.0%
(0)

4.8%
(20)

3.5%
(2)

7%
(13)

0.0%
(0)

8.6%
(36)

3.5%
(2)

11.3%
(21)

15%
(3)

15.3%
(64)

8.8%
(5)

19.9%
(37)

15%
(3)

24.2%
(101)

31.6%
(18)

28.0%
(52)

45%
(9)

All ALJ
Cases

"NPA"
Rationale
Used -

ALJ

L

29.4%
(123)

14.0%
(8)

31.7%
(59)

40.0%
(8)

48.1%
(201)

78.9%
(45)

52.7%
(98)

75%
(15)

NOTE: The percentages in Table 7 reflect the percentage of cases in
which coders could identify the type of illegal activity allegedly
disclosed. At the OSHA Level, the type of disclosure made could be
discerned in 418 cases. At the ALJ Level, it could be ascertained in
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186 cases. For the "no protected activity" columns, the percentages
are from the 57 OSHA cases and the 20 AW cases in which "no
protected activity" was the rationale used by OSHA and the AW,
respectively, and the type of illegal activity allegedly disclosed could
be discerned. The percentages do not equal 100%because more than
one protected activity could be alleged.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

As Table 7 indicates, employees alleged that they blew the whistle
on general "fraud" or fraud related generally to "accounting" a t a
much higher rate than the more specific types of fraud mentioned
by the Act, including mail and wire fraud, banking fraud, and
securities fraud.''' Moreover, a n extremely high number of employees did not assert that they disclosed illegal activity related to any
of the categories set forth by Sarbanes-Oxley: 48% of OSHA
complainants and 52.7% of ALJ complainants alleged protected
activity in the "other" category, at least a s these allegations were
described by administrative decision makers in their written
opinions.210
These data are particularly relevant'when examined next to data
of cases in which the decision maker found for the employer
precisely because the employee did not engage in a protected
activity. In these "no protected activity" cases, certain types of
illegal activity were alleged more frequently than in the overall pool
of cases. As indicated in Table 7, the employee alleged blowing the
whistle on illegal activity falling within the "other" category and the
"fraud" category more frequently in cases in which the decision
maker utilized the "no protected activity" rationale than in the
overall pool of cases.

209. These more specific types of fraud were only coded in the study if the decision
mentioned these very specific words or statutory provisions as part of the allegations. In
contrast, coders employed general "fraud" a s a catch-all category in which fraud was
mentioned in the decision, but not related to a specific statutory provision. Similarly,
"accounting fraud" was coded if a n allegation related to accounting, but not to a more specific
category.
210. See Table 7 supra. These decisions may not necessarily reflect the language used by
an employee to describe the employee's protected activity. However, the results do reflect how
OSHA and the AUs thought about the employee's allegations regarding protected activity.
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Employees alleged protected activity in the "other" category in
78.9% and 75% of the cases a t the OSHA and A W Levels, respectively, in which decision makers utilized the "no protected activity"
rationale. In the overall pool of cases, 48.1% of the OSHA complainants and 52.7% of the ALJ complainants alleged t h e "other"
category. A similar, yet smaller, jump can be seen when comparing
the general "fraud" category in the same way. A higher percentage
of cases utilized this rationale among the "no protected activity"
cases than among the overall population of cases: 31.6% versus
24.2% a t the OSHA Level, and 45% versus 28% a t the ALJ Level.
Thus, OSHA and ALJs often utilized the "no protected activity"
rationale in cases in which the employee alleged generalized
protected activity, such a s disclosing "fraud" or some "other" misconduct. Employees who alleged specific types of misconduct, such
a s "mail fraud" or "federal law relating to shareholder fraud," rarely
lost cases because the decision maker found "no protected activity."
This outcome could reflect OSHA's and AWs' reluctance to define
broadly the categories of whistleblower disclosures that SarbanesOxley will protect. These two categories of "fraud" and "other"
misconduct could be characterized a s the most amorphous and least
bound by the specific statutory language of the Act. I n other words,
those employees who framed their whistleblower disclosures to fall
neatly within the Act's specific statutory provisions, such a s mail or
wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities fraud, fared better than
employees who alleged protected activity less grounded i n statutory
language.
Examining specific ALJ cases qualitatively demonstrates that
many ALJs interpreted the Act's "protected activity" requirement
narrowly. U s required that whistleblowing employees draw a
direct line between their disclosures of misconduct and the misconduct's relationship to shareholder fraud."' For example, in Grant u.
Dominion East Ohio Gas, a n ALJ found that a n employee properly
211. See, e.g., Grant v. Dominion E. Ohio Gas, 2004-SOX-63, at 40 (AWMar. 10, 2005);
Harvey v. Safeway, Inc., 2004-SOX-21, at 32 (AWFeb. 11, 2005) (finding that disclosures
about underpayment of wages "did not have [the] necessary magnitude to raise a concern
about fraud against the shareholders");Hopkins v. ATKTactical Sys., 2004-SOX-19,at 5 (ALJ
May 27, 2004) (dismissing claim based on retaliation for disclosing an employer's "release of
sludge water into the ground water system" because disclosure neither alleged fraud nor
"involve[d]transactions relating to securities").
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reported accounting irregularities and errors, but found that the
employee did not engage in "protected activity" because the employee was unable to tie these irregularities directly to active fraud
on the shareholder^.^'^ Similarly, the employees in Allen v. Stewart
Enterprises, Inc., reported to their supervisors several instances
of faulty interest calculations, inconsistent and untimely refunds,
and improper accounting involving cost recognition.213 The ALJ
refused to find a "protected activity" because the employees could
not demonstrate that these errors and omissions in financial
accounting and reporting were related to a broader scheme of
intentional corporate
ALJs also demanded that employee whistleblowers specifically
inform the recipient of a whistleblower disclosure that the illegal
activity being reported violates one of Sarbanes-Oxley's identified
federal laws.215 Under this interpretation, rather than merely
reporting activity that a n employee reasonably views a s illegal, the
employee must have enough legal knowledge to tie that activity to
a specific illegality identified by the
Yet, despite this narrow interpretation by some U s , others took
a relatively broad view of the Act's "protected activity" requirement
in specific cases. One early AU decision held that whistleblower
disclosures about fraud that amounted to only .0001% of the parent
company's revenues could be protected.217As noted by the ALJ,
Sarbanes-Oxley
212. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t 40-44 (emphasizing that the 'limited scope and
application of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not cover the complaints and allegations lodged
by Complainant").
213. See Allen v. Stewart Enters., 2004-SOX-60, a t 83-84 (ALJ Feb. 15,2005).
214. See id. a t 85-90.
215. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t 40 ("[Slimply raising questions and lodging complaints
without any reference to or suspicion about fraud against shareholders is not protected
activity."). This requirement seems to contradict other ALJ decisions which held that a
whistleblower was not required to specifically identify a particular code section that had been
violated. See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, a t 10 (ALJ Dec. 9, 2004); Gonzalez v.
Colonial Bank, 2004-SOX-39,a t 5 (ALJ Aug. 20,2004) (finding "support [for the] finding" that
whistleblower had a reasonable belief that the activity disclosed involved "misconduct,
regardless of whether he could speclfy specific banking, securities, shareholder, or mail fraud
violations." (footnote omitted)).
216. See Grant, 2004-SOX-63, a t 39; cf. Allen, 2004-SOX-60, a t 86 (denying protection for
whistleblower who reported a potential violation of state law, because such a n illegality is not
specifically listed by Sarbanes-Oxley).
217. See Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t 4-5 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004).
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places no minimum dollar value on the protected activity it
covers. Whether or not "materiality" is a required element of a
criminal fraud conviction as Respondents contend, we need [to]
be mindful that Sarbanes-Oxleyis largely a prophylactic, not a
punitive measure. The mere existence of alleged manipulation,
if contrary to a regulatory standard, might not be criminal in
nature, but it very well might reveal flaws in the internal
controls that could implicate whistleblower coverage for seemingly paltry sums.218
Furthermore, a n ALJ held that the Act protected disclosures
related to improper reimbursements to company employees, with no
discussion of whether these reimbursements were "material" and
thus required disclosure under the securities laws.219Another ALJ
found that "protected activity" included a whistleblower's report of
a n employee's improper use of company materials and time to create
sculptures for retiring coworkers.220The Act protected this report
because the sculptor "undoubtedly used the mail or wires as part of
his sculpture business," and such fraudulent use would violate the
mail and wire fraud statutes.221
Commentators point to these examples and counterexamples
a s indications that ALJs are working through the Act's ambiguities, with decisions in favor of both employees and employers.222
However, the study's results indicate that the various interpretations of the "protected activity" requirement are not a s evenly
balanced a s these examples and counterexamples might indicate. In
fact, the study demonstrates that OSHA and the U s frequently
denied whistleblower claims because the employee purportedly
failed to engage in "protected
Decision makers resolved
fully 24.1% of ALJ cases and 18.2% of OSHA cases in which the
employer won because the employee did not allege the correct

218. Id. at 5.
219. See Platone v. Atl. Coast Airlines, 2003-SOX-27, at 22 (ALJApr. 30,2004).
220. See Hendrix v. Am. Airlines, 2004-SOX-23, at 9-10 (AW Dec. 9,2004).
221. See id. at 10.
222. See, e.g., Eugene Scalia, The Developing Law under the Sarbanes-&ley
"Whistleblower"Protection Provision, 735 PLULIT 291 (2006);Triplett, supra note 139, at 482.
223. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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"protected
The study also found that in addition to these
cases, the ALJ determined that the employee could not reasonably
believe that the activity disclosed violated a law set forth in
Sarbanes-Oxley in 14.5% of the decisions in which employers
3. A Surprisingly Unfavorable Burden of Proof

As discussed above, ALJs relied exclusively or primarily on legal
rationales in 95.2% of the cases won by employers, while U s
resolved only 4.8% of the cases using solely a causation rationale.226
By contrast, OSHA reached the causation issues in 33.3% of the
cases decided for employers.227The results of the study call into
question whether OSHA appropriately applied Sarbanes-Oxley's
employee-friendly burden of proof in these causation cases.228
Despite Sarbanes-Oxley's favorable burden of proof, employees a t
the OSHA Level rarely won when causation issues were evaluated.
At this level, 121 cases presented only the factual question of why
the employee suffered a n adverse action.229In these cases, the
employee engaged in protected activity and suffered a n adverse
employment action. According to OSHA, the employee overcame all
the procedural and boundary
The only question to be
answered was whether the employer retaliated against the employee for engaging in a protected activity. As shown in Table 8,
employees prevailed in only 10.7% of these 121 OSHA cases.

224. See Table 4 supra.
225. See id. The "reasonable belief' rationale was used less frequently a t the OSHA Level.
OSHA used this rationale in 5.6% of the cases that employers won. See id.
226. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
227. See Table 5 supra; see supra note 166 and accompanying text.
228. Recall that in a Sarbanes-Oxley case, after a n employee presents a prima facie case
using the forgiving "contributing factor" standard, the burden of proof shifts to the employer,
which must then satisfy a sigdicantly higher burden than normal. See Klopfenstein v. PCC
Flow Techs. Holdings, Inc., No. 04-149,a t 19-21(ARBMay 31,2006);see also discussion supra
Part I.B.
229. This number was derived by examining cases in which OSHA decided in favor of the
employer based solely on a causation rationale (108 observations) and cases in which the
employee prevailed (13observations). The employee wins were included because these cases,
by definition, reached the causation element of the complaint. See infra Table 8.
230. In other words, OSHA did not utilize a procedural or boundary rationale in its
determination.
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Table 8:Win Rates for Cases with Only Causation Disputes
Outcome
Employee win
Employer win
Total

OSHA
Level
10.7%
(13)"
89.3%
(108)
100.0%
(121)

ALJ ~ e v e l
55.6%
(5)
44.4%
(4)

100.0%
(9)

-

NOTE: Employer wins were included when "no employer knowledge,"
"contributing factor," or the employer's "rebuttal" were the only
rationales provided by the decision maker.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

By contrast, a t the ALJ Level, only a small number of cases
-10.2%, or 9 out of 88-presented a causation issue regarding the
"contributing factor" test or the employer's rebuttal burden.231As
discussed above, procedural or boundary rationales resolved the
remaining ALJ employer-win cases.232Of these 9 cases involving
only causation disputes, U s decided over half (5, or 55.6%) in
favor of the employee.233
Comparing the 10.7% win rate a t the OSHA Level for "causation"
cases with other win rates emphasizes its aberrational nature.234
231. See Table 8 supra. The total of nine ALJ cases was calculated by combining five
employee wins on the merits with four employer wins in which a n ALJ utilized a causation
rationale. Although six employees won a t the AW Level, one employee won by default because
the employer did not appear a t the hearing. Thus, the ALJ did not address the causation
issues in the case.
232. See supra notes 161-65and accompanying text.
233. See Table 8 supra. The ALJ results also confirm the impact U s ' focus on legal
rationales has on an employee's chance of success. If employees survived ALJs' legal analysis
of procedural and boundary issues, employees seemed to benefit from Sarbanes-Oxley's
favorable burden of proof.
234. Although the win rates in Table 8 seem to approach, and even surpass, the win rates
under other statutes set forth in Table 2 supra,the employee win rates set forth in Table 8
occur in cases with only factual disputes involving causation, that is, all of the legal hurdles
have been overcome. The win rates in Table 2 are overall win rates for cases in which a
decision was rendered a t any stage in the administrative or judicial process.
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The strongest comparison may be with similar cases a t the ALJ
Level, in which 55.6% of employees won when only causation issues
were evaluated. However, given the small raw number of ALJ
decisions, consider other comparisons. For example, under other
employment statutes, win rates for cases that survive summary
judgment and have a trial are analogous to win rates for cases with
only causation disputes set forth in Table 8. A study of whistleblower wrongful discharge cases in California in 1998 and 1999 found
that employees won 63% of the time a t tria1236-almost six times the
rate of employee wins a t the OSHA Level under Sarbanes-Oxley.
Another study found that, in 2001,39.5% of employment discrimination plaintiffs won trials in federal
When compared with
these win rates, the 10.7% win rate for causation cases a t the OSHA
Level seems extraordinarily low.
One explanation for this 10.7% win rate may be that OSHA
inappropriately utilized Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burden
of proof. For example, the employee's initial burden to prove that
the protected activity was a "contributing factor" in the retaliation
should be a relatively low burden to overcome. Yet, a s shown i n
Table 9, in over two-thirds of the 121 "causation rationale" cases
(69.4%), OSHA determined that the employee did not meet this
relatively low burden. Thus, because OSHA determined that the
employee failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation in these
cases, OSHA never shifted the burden from the employee to force
"clear and convincing" proof from the employer.237By contrast, at
the ALJ Level, the opposite result occurred. ALJs found that
employees satisfied the "contributing factor" test and shifted the
burden to employers in 66.7% of the "causation rationale" cases a t
the ALJ

235. See Oppenheimer, supra note 15, at 538.
236. See Clermont & Schwab, supra note 17, at 441.
237. Nine of these 84 cases won by the employer alternatively held that the employer
satisfied its "clear and convincing" evidence burden, utilizing an "even if" argument.
238. See Table 9 infra.
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Table 9: Determination of Contributing Factor Issue
Outcome
For Em~lovee- Employee
demonstrated protected activity was contributing factor in
retaliation
For Emplover - Employee
failed to satisfy the contributing factor test
Total

OSHA
Level

ALJ Level

30.6%
(37)"

66.7%

69.4%
(84)

33.3%
(3)

100.0%
(121)

100.0%
(9)

(6)

NOTE: Table 9 shows the result when the employee's "causation"
burden is examined. Cases resolved "for the employer" determined
that the employee failed to demonstrate that the employer had
knowledge about the protected activity, or that the employee failed to
satisfy the "contributing factor" test. Cases resolved for the employee
on this issue included cases in which the employee won and cases in
which the employer won solely because the employer satisfied its
rebuttal burden of proof.
" All numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

Furthermore, even when OSHA shifted the burden to the
employer and the issue was whether the employer met the "clear
and convincing" standard, OSHA found in favor of the employer in
a surprising number of cases. As set forth in Table 10, employees
won only 13 of the 37 cases (35.1%) in which the employer had a
"clear and convincing" burden of proof.239 Importantly, these
employee wins occurred in Sarbanes-Oxley cases in which all
Sarbanes-Oxley's legal requirements were met and the employer
-not the employee-had the burden of proof under a "clear and
convincing" standard. This difference in burdens should and can
matter; by comparison, when the dispositive issue a t the ALJ Level

239. See Table 10 infra.
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was whether the "clear and convincing" burden was met, employees
won 83.3%of the time.240
Table 10: Determination of Employer's Rebuttal Burden of Proof
Outcome
For Employee - Employer
failed to satisfy burden of proof
by clear and convincing
evidence
For Emplover - Employer satisfied burden of proof

OSHA
Level

ALJ Level

35.1%
(13)"

83.3%
(5)

64.9%

16.7%
(24)
(1)
100.0%
100.0%
Total
(37)
(6)
" AU numbers in parentheses reflect the number of cases in each
category.

The results a t the OSHA Level contradicted expectations, for
these were cases in which the employee supposedly met all of the
legal hurdles required by Sarbanes-Oxley. The employee engaged in
protected activity and suffered a n adverse employment action. The
only question was whether a causal link existed between these
events. Given the low burden for a n employee to prove this point
and the high burden for a n employer, in essence, to disprove a
negative (that it would have made the same decision regardless of
the protected activity) on rebuttal, it seems reasonable to expect
that more than 10.7% of employees would win these "causation"
cases.
A possible explanation for these findings is that OSHA did not
have the resources to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley cases within
the time frame the Agency's regulations required for it to complete
~~'
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower cases
a n i n ~ e s t i g a t i o n . Although
240. See id. I t should be noted that the number of cases is very small: only six cases reached
this stage, five of which were won by employees. This disparity between OSHA and the ALJs
seems to support the conclusion that OSHA may examine causation issues more readily than
the ALJs, but when U s do examine them, the results seem more favorable to employees
than a t the OSHA Level.
241. As noted above, the average time between the filing of a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint

20071

UNFULFILLED EXPECTATIONS

125

currently comprise 13.2% of the whistleblower cases administered
by OSHA,242OSHA did not receive any additional funding to
increase its investigative staff by hiring investigators with experience in securities laws a s opposed to worker health and safety.243
This lack of resources may have caused investigators to take
shortcuts, thereby limiting the depth and scope of inquiry into a n
employee's claims. Indeed, some employees and their attorneys
assert that OSHA investigators did not interview employeecomplainants and failed to provide employees with a chance to
argue their cases
In addition to OSHA's lack of resources, OSHA's investigative
manual does not adequately explain Sarbanes-Oxley's unique
burden of proof structure. The sections of the manual t h a t explain
general investigative procedures give examples from the less
employee-friendly burden of proof found in the Occupational Safety
and Health
This general section explains that a "nexus" must
be found between a whistleblower's protected activity and the
adverse employment action, and describes the employer's rebuttal
a s requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.246Although
the specific chapter on Sarbanes-Oxley uses the proper "contributing
factor" and "clear and convincing" standards, OSHA's investigative
procedures section does not elaborate on the differences between
this language and the language of the Occupational Safety and
Health
OSHA's investigative manual could easily mislead

with OSHA and the issuance of a report by the OSHA investigator was 127 days for Fiscal
Year 2005. See supra text accompanying note 91; see also E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir.,
OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author (Feb. 15, 2006) (on file with author).
OSHA's regulations require a n investigation to be completed within 60 days. See 29 C.F.R.
3 1980.105 (2006).
242. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Mar. 2, 2007) (on frle with author).
243. See Telephone Discussion with Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative
Assistance (Jan. 29, 2007); see also Deborah Solomon, For Financial Whistle-Blowers, New
Shield is a n Imperfect One, W W ST. J., Oct. 4, 2004, a t A1 (reporting that OSHA
investigators acknowledged that OSHA was "struggling with the new mandate" from
Sarbanes-Oxley).
244. See Solomon, supra note 243.
245. See OSHA, WHISTLEBLOWER
INVESTIGATIONS MANUAL 3-2, 3-3 (Aug. 22, 2003),
available a t http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/index.html.
246. See id.
247. See id. a t 14-2.
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OSHA's investigators a s to the true nature of Sarbanes-Oxley's
unique burden of proof structure.
Moreover, employers have several procedural advantages that
may explain OSHA's willingness to accept a n employer's explanation for a n adverse employment action. OSHA does not have
subpoena power and therefore cannot force employers to provide
documents or require witnesses to testify.248OSHA regulations
allow employers to meet with investigators and dispute OSHA's
conclusions, but employees do not have these same rights.249Prior
to April 2006, employees did not necessarily receive the employer's
response to the complaint, even though employers received a copy
of the employee's complaint.250 Employers can also specifically
request that OSHA withhold confidential information from employees during and after the i n v e s t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ~ '
The way in which OSHA resolves cases involving disputes about
causation may reflect these investigative issues. When deciding
against employees so frequently in these "causation rationale" cases,
OSHA closely evaluated the employee's own behavior, which the
employer likely emphasized during the investigation. Two evidentiary determinations seem to have particularly influenced OSHA
investigators. First, in almost half of the cases citing a causation
rationale in favor of the employer (48.1%), OSHA found that the
employee engaged i n improper behavior, such a s insubordination or
illegal
Second, in 43.5% of these "causation rationale"
248. See Solomon, supra note 243. By contrast, Congress provided OSHA with subpoena
power to f u l f i OSHA's obligations under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. See 29
U.S.C. 5 657(b) (2000).
249. See 29 C.F.R. 5 1980.104(e) (2006); Solomon, supra note 243.
250. On April 11,2006, OSHA revised its investigative procedures. OSHA now states that:
During an investigation, disclosure must be made to the complainant of a t least
the substance of the respondent's response. Other evidence submitted by the
respondent (or the substance of it) may also be disclosed, so that the
complainant can fully respond to the respondent's position and the investigation
can proceed to a final resolution. The form and timing of the disclosure are a t
OSHA's discretion.
OSHA, REVISEDINTERIMGUIDELINESON CHANGESIN PROCEDURES
FOR HANDLINGPRIVACY
ACT FILES AND FREEDOMOF INFORMATION
ACT REQUESTS9 II.A.2 (Apr. 11, 2006), available
at http://www.osha.gov/dep/oia/whistleblower/Reviseddinterim_guidelines.html.
251. See 29 C.F.R. 1 1980.104(d) (2006); Solomon, supra note 243.
252. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to support
a causation decision for a n employer can be found a t Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t
tb1.M.
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cases, OSHA found that the employee suffered an adverse employment action because of poor performance rather than a s a result of
retaliation.253
The importance of these two types of factual findings-bad
not surprising.
employee behavior and poor performance-is
Scholars have documented that a typical reaction of employers to
retaliation suits by whistleblowers is to attack the whistleblowers'
behavior.254I n fact, by definition, a whistleblower in a retaliation
lawsuit suffered some sort of adverse employment action that the
employer must j ~ s t l f y . ~ ~ ~
But, OSHA rarely utilized other possible evidentiary facts i n
support of its decisions, or a t least OSHA failed to discuss additional
facts in its decision letters. For example, in these causation
rationale cases, OSHA's decision letters rarely discussed witness
credibility (4.6%), the timing of the adverse action in relation to
the protected activity (5.6%), or whether the employer followed
its normal procedures in disciplining the employee (3.7%).256
Furthermore, OSHA decisions only occasionally discussed whether
the employer claimed to treat the whistleblowers similarly to the
rest of its employees (15.7%) or whether the employee's discharge
occurred a s part of a reduction-in-force (11.1%).~~~
OSHA's heavy
reliance on the employee's behavior in justifying its decision, while
underutilizing other potential evidence related to a n employer's
actions and policies, seems to support the conclusion that OSHA did
not fully investigate and evaluate both sides of the disputes
analyzed. OSHA seemed merely to accept the employer's position,
perhaps because the employee was not a s involved in the investigation.
By comparison, employees may have won causation cases at the
AU Level more frequently than a t the OSHA Level because ALJs
have the luxury of hearing full testimony from both sides, complete
with demeanor evidence of witnesses and cross-examination.258For
253. See id.
254. See, e.g., Bruce D. Fisher, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: A False Hope for
Whistleblowers, 43 RUTGERS L.REV.355, 364 (1991).
255. See supra Part I.A.
256. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or A U s to support
a decision for an employer can be found at Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, at tb1.M.
257. See id.
258. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
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example, witness credibility played a n important role a t the A M
Level in cases analyzed by this study, while this factor was almost
irrelevant a t the OSHA Level; in 75% of the "causation rationale"
cases won by the employer a t the ALJ Level, ALJs relied on the
credibility of the witnesses to make a decision, a s compared to 4.6%
a t the OSHA
Similarly, in all five employee wins resulting
from a n ALJ hearing, the ALJ cited "witness credibility" a s a factor
in deciding in favor of the employee.260Only 41.7% of the OSHA
employee wins recognized this factor a s important in OSHA's
decision.261
4. Conclusion: Narrow Boundaries and a High Burden

The results of the present study indicate that OSHA and the
ALJs failed to fulfill employees' expectations of broad protections in
the initial years after the Act's enactment.262Employers consistently
won Sarbanes-Oxley cases because OSHA and the ALJs found that
employees failed to present claims within the legal parameters of
the
Part of the explanation for this low win rate could be that
employees filed frivolous or borderline claims that clearly did not
fall within the Act's boundaries.264This explanation suggests that
the employee win rate should increase a s employees and their
attorneys learn from these outcomes and file fewer cases requiring
a broad reading of the Act. The use of procedural and boundary
259. See Moberly, Basic Data, supm note 135, a t tb1.M. I t is important to remember that
the total number of causation rationale cases a t the ALJ Level is quite small.
260. A complete table of important evidentiary factors cited by OSHA or ALJs to support
a decision for a n employee can be found a t Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t tbl.1.
261. See id.
262. See supra Part IIIA.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 159-68;see also Table 4 supm.
264. Indeed, to explain the low employee win rate, OSHA posited the theory that early
Sarbanes-Oxley employees pushed the outer boundaries of the Act. See Discussion with
Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance (Oct. 3,2006); E-mail from Nilgun
Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author (July 11, 2005) (on file with
author); cf Colker, Winning, supra note 15, a t 258-65 (exploring this thesis with data from
ADA appellate cases); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard
to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV.555, 567 (2001) (asserting that claims on the "outer perimetern of the
Americans with Disabilities Act may "represent a natural evolution of a new and innovative
statute that left much room for interpretation").
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rationales should decrease and causation rationales involving
factual disputes should increase a s attorneys and employees
determine where administrative decision makers draw the parameters of the Act.
However, the study's results contradict these predictions. During
the course of the study, procedural and boundary rationales did not
decrease over time. In fact, a s seen in Chart 2, infra, the trend a t
the OSHA Level was to resolve increasingly more cases over time by
using boundary rationales, perhaps following the lead of the ALJs.
With regard to the A U s , Chart 3, infra, demonstrates that there
was no discernable decline in the use of either procedural or
boundary rationales over time.
Moreover, recent statistics provided by OSHA demonstrate that
no employee won any of the 159 cases that OSHA resolved during
Fiscal Year 2006, which ended on September 30, 2 0 0 6 . ~This
~ ~ lack
of employee victories four years after the Act's enactment suggests
explanations other than a stubborn insistence by employees and
their attorneys to file frivolous claims. Indeed, the study demonstrates that OSHA and the ALJs particularly focused on two new
legal boundaries to whistleblower law implemented by SarbanesOxley: a new definition of a "covered employer" and a new type
of "protected activity." Qualitative evidence from ALJ decisions
regarding these topics demonstrate that ALJs often interpreted
these new boundaries narrowly.266All of these results suggest that,
even if employees filed some cases requiring a broad reading of the
Act, OSHA and the ALJs also contributed to the low employee win
rate by strictly construing the legal boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Such discrepancies between a whistleblower's expectations regarding the Act's applicability and how the Act actually was applied
likely caused a substantially lower win rate than might otherwise
be expected.267

265. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Oct. 3, 2006) (on file with author).
266. See supra Parts III.B.2.b. III.B.2.c.
267. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 149, at 590 ("[Alnother type of powerful
explanation of aberrant win rates is the parties' mutual misperceptions about the prevailing
standard of decision.").
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Chart 2: Rationales Used by OSHA Over Time
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Moreover, even for cases that did fall within the strict boundaries
of Sarbanes-Oxley, OSHA failed to fulfill employees' expectations for
protection based upon the Act's employee-friendly burden of proof
for causation. Employers won almost 90% of these "causation" cases
in front of OSHA, indicating that OSHA failed to properly apply the
Act's burden-shifting requirement^.^^' OSHA seemed more willing
than the U s to delve into messy factual issues involving causation, but when OSHA did evaluate the causation elements of a case,
employees rarely

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
An employee who files a Sarbanes-Oxley claim faces a steeper
uphill battle than most employees asserting claims against a n
employer under comparable employee ~ t a t u t e s . ~Simply
"
put, this
study's results suggest that Sarbanes-Oxley does not protect
employee whistleblowers to the extent Congress envisioned when it
passed the Act. This Part presents three suggestions to remedy this
underenforcement of a statute that Congress intended to provide
broad remedial relief and encouragement to whistleblowers.
First, Congress should increase the Act's statute of limitations
from 90 to a t least 180 days. Second, Congress should address
OSHA's and the U s ' emphasis on "boundary" issues by clarrfylng
the breadth of application that Congress intended for the Act. Third,
Congress should attend to OSHA's inappropriate application of
Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burden of proof, either by giving
OSHA more resources to investigate Sarbanes-Oxley complaints
thoroughly or by eliminating OSHA's role a s principal investigator
of these claims.
Finally, this Part recommends further research regarding
whether the faults in Sarbanes-Oxley highlighted by this study
suggest that Congress should implement even broader whistleblower protections.

268. See Table 8 supra.
269. See supra Part III.B.3.
270. See discussion supra Part 1II.A(comparingwin rates with other employment statutes);
see also Table 2 supra.
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A. Amending the Statute of Limitations Procedural Hurdle
The study's results indicate that OSHA and U s denied large
numbers of whistleblowers Sarbanes-Oxleyprotection because of the
restrictive 90-day statute of limitations.271Often, a slightly longer
limitations period would have mattered: in almost half of the ALJ
statute of limitations cases (46.4%, or 13 out of 28 cases), employees
filed Sarbanes-Oxley claims between 90 and 180 days after a n
adverse action.272These results highlight a n unnecessary procedural
obstacle for employees.273
A longer filing period would enable OSHA or a n ALJ to hear the
merits of many of these claims. Moreover, most employees who filed
Sarbanes-Oxley claims alleged that they lost their j ~ b s . ~ ~ ~ A d d i t i o n a l
time to file claims would provide whistleblowers the ability to first
take care of other, more pressing responsibilities, such a s finding
another job and dealing with the upheaval of losing a primary
source of income. Furthermore, more than 90 days should be
provided for a whistleblower to locate a competent attorney and for
the attorney to investigate a claim thoroughly before filing with the
Department of Labor.
A longer limitations period would also ameliorate the drastic
consequences resulting from any confusion regarding the beginning
of the limitations period. Such confusion may result from the wellenforced rule that the statute of limitations begins running when
the employee has notice of a n adverse action, rather than when the
action o c c ~ r s ~ ~ ~
rule
- a that can lead to disputes regarding when
such notice was received and whether the notice was clear. Disputes
about notice seem more likely when the limitations period is shorter
because the few days or weeks between notice and a n actual adverse
271. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
272. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 2006-SOX-56, a t 2 (AWMay 8,2006) (filed
95 days after adverse action); Stone v. Duke Energy Corp., 2006-SOX-48, a t 3 (ALJ Apr. 7,
2006) (filed 92 days after adverse action). OSHA decisions either did not contain these data
or, if a decision did indicate the number of days between the retaliation and the filing, OSHA
redacted those data under a n exception to the Freedom of Information Act.
273. Of course, it is not known how many whistleblowers experienced retaliation but never
filed because the limitations period had expired before they realized they might have a
remedy.
274. The study found that 81.8% (3781462) of complainants whose allegation regarding
retaliation was discernable alleged that they were fired from their jobs a s retaliation.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
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employment action become crucial with a shorter statute of
limitations.
Lengthening the statute of limitations should not negatively
impact the ability of a n employer to defend itself. Many employment statutes have limitations periods of 180 days or more, and
employers have not had difficulty marshalling evidence to defend
themselves.276In fact, various federal statutes require most employers to keep certain records on employees for one year or more,
resulting in the typical practice of maintaining a n employee's file for
a t least this period of time.277
No compelling rationale for a 90-day limitations period appears
in the literature on labor relations, employee rights, or whistleblowing. In fact, the original version of Sarbanes-Oxley contained a 180day statute of limitations.278When the Senate Judiciary Committee
considered the original bill, Senators Grassley and Leahy offered a n
amendment, apparently to mollify a group of Republican senators.279
The amendment weakened a number of key whistleblower provisions, including reducing the statute of limitations to 90 days.2s0
Although the shorter limitations period may have been a necessary
political compromise, the period's short duration undermines the

276. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 3 706(e)(l), 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-5(e)(l)
(2000) (300 days if charge is first instituted with state or local agency; otherwise 180 days);
Americans With Disabilities Act 3 107(a), 42 U.S.C. 3 12117(a) (2000) (incorporating Title
VII's statute of limitations); Age Discrimination in Employment Act 3 7(d), 29 U.S.C. 3 626(d)
(2000) (either 180 or 300 days if state law provides relief for age discrimination); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 3 255 (2000) (two or three years, depending on employer intent);
Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. $31105(b) (2000) (180 days); Pipeline Safety
Improvement Act of 2002,49 U.S.C. 3 60129@)(1)(Supp. I1 2002) (180 days). The Government
Accountability Project (GAP) suggests that a "realistic" statute of limitations is an essential
provision for an anti-retaliation statute to provide true protection for whistleblowers. See
Testimony of Tom Devine, Legal Dir., Gov't Accountability Project, for the Working Group on
Probity and Pub. Ethics, Org. of Am. States (Mar. 31, 2000), available at http://www.oas.org/
juridico/english/tom-devine.htm.Specifically, the GAP suggests that a "one year statute of
limitations is consistent with common law rights and has proved functional." Id.
277. See 29 C.F.R. 3 1602.14 (2006) (EEOC regulation requiring employers to maintain
certain employment records for a t least one year); 29 C.F.R. 3 516.5 (2006) (Department of
Labor regulation requiring employers to maintain payroll and other wage records for three
years).
278. See 148 CONG.REC.27, 1789-90 (2002).
279. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, a t 22, 26 (2002) (indicating the group of senators to include
Senators Hatch, Thurmond, Grassley, Kyl, DeWine, Sessions, Brownback, and McConnell).
280. See id. a t 22, 26.
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Act's goals of deterring corporate fraud and remedying retaliation
against whistleblowers.
A statute of limitations is obviously necessary; however, whistleblowers have been prevented from asserting potentially valid claims
because this procedural requirement is too restrictive. Given the
complex nature of these cases, and the reluctance of OSHA, A U s ,
and the ARB to consider equitable relief from the requirements of
the statute of limitations, Congress should amend Sarbanes-Oxley
to provide for a limitations period of a t least 180 days.

B. Clarifying the Act's Boundaries
The study's results also indicate that the administrative review
process focused intensely on the legal boundaries of a SarbanesOxley claim.281Administrative decision makers particularly concentrated on two '%oundary" issues: the "covered employer" and the
"protected activity" requirements for a prima facie case.282These
decision makers interpreted each of these provisions in ways that
overly restricted whistleblower claims. To address this administrative scrutiny, Congress should amend Sarbanes-Oxley to clarify the
Act's boundaries in a t least three specific ways. First, Congress
should clarify the extent to which certain privately held companies
are "covered employers" because of their connection to publicly
traded companies. Second, Congress should reemphasize the broad
scope of protected activity that Sarbanes-Oxley protects. Third,
Congress should require the agencies administering the Act to
provide more information to the public regarding their decisionmaking processes for whistleblower cases.
1. Clarifying the Definition of a "Covered Employer"

ALJs and the ARB strictly construed the definition of "covered
employer." First, a s discussed above,283ALJs and the ARB imposed
onerous requirements for employees to bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims
against privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded companies. For
281. See Table 5 supra.
282. See supra Part 1II.B.
283. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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example, under some decisions, employees must pierce the corporate
veil in order to bring a claim against a privately held s u b ~ i d i a r y . ~ ~
Yet, this requirement ignores the law's treatment of subsidiaries a s
"agents" of publicly traded companies for accounting and financial
reporting purposes.28s Subsidiaries "are a n integral part of the
publicly traded company, inseparable from it for purposes of
evaluating the integrity of its financial information, and they must
A parent company's internal corporate
be treated a s
controls must include ,providing a subsidiary's material financial
information to the parent company's officers, who are required to
certify the parent's annual or quarterly reports.287For SarbanesOxley purposes, a t least, a "publicly traded corporation is ... the sum
of its constituent units," including any privately held subsidiaries.288
Thus, concluded one ALJ, "the scope of Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection tracks the flow of financial and accounting information
throughout the corporate structure and remains a s permeable to
the internal 'corporate veils' a s the financial information itself."289
By contrast, other ALJ decisions and the ARB'S recent opinion
requiring the piercing of the corporate veil seem misguided i n light
of this persuasive reasoning equating whistleblower protection with
other corporate reporting reforms enacted by S a r b a n e s - O ~ l e y . ~ ~ ~
284. See supra text accompanying note 201.
285. See Morefield v. Exelon Sews., Inc., 2004-SOX-2, a t 2 (ALJ Jan. 28,2004).
286. Id.
287. See id. (citing Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 9 302(a)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4)(B)
(Supp. I11 2003)).
288. Id. a t 3. As put by one ALJ in a Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower case:
The publicly traded entity is not a free-floating apex. When its value and
performance [are] based, in part, on the value and performance of component
entities within its organization, the statute ensures that those entities are
subject to internal controls applicable throughout the corporate structure, that
they are subject to the oversight responsibility of the audit committee, and that
the officers who sign
- the financials are aware of material information relatingto the subsidiaries. A publicly traded corporation is, for Sarbanes-Oxley
purposes, the sum of its constituent units; and Congress insisted upon accuracy
and integrity in financial reporting a t all levels of the corporate structure,
including the non-publicly traded subsidiaries. In this context, the law
recognizes a s an obstacle no internal corporate barriers to the remedies
Congress deemed necessary. I t imposed reforms upon the publicly traded
company, and through it, to its entire corporate organization.
Id.
289. Morefield, 2004-SOX-2, a t 3.
290. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
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Second, ALJs uniformly held that privately held companies that
serve a s contractors of publicly traded companies are not "covered
entities" under Sarbanes-Oxley, and therefore cannot be liable
under the
The ALJs interpreted the Act's language to mean
that a n "officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent" of
a publicly traded company may not retaliate against a n employee
of the public company.292According to the ALJs, the Act's antiretaliation protections do not extend to employees of contractors,
subcontractors, and agents unless the contractor, subcontractor, or
agent is itself a public company.293Based on such a limited interpretation of the Act's language, ALJs dismissed a number of cases
without addressing the factual merits of whether a n employee was
retaliated against for engaging in protected activity.294
ALJs' unwillingness to apply the Act directly to employees of
"contractors, subcontractors, and agents" also appears unnecessary
and contrary to congressional intent. As Professor Robert Vaughn
has argued, the Act's use of the term "employee" not only could
mean a n employee of a public company, but also could include
coverage for employees of a contractor, subcontractor, or agent of a
public company.295Professor Vaughn noted that when Congress
wants to limit the coverage of a whistleblower statute to certain
employees, it does so very clearly.296For example, the AIR21 statute
(on which much of Sarbanes-Oxley's procedural requirements are
based) specifically refers to discrimination against "airline employees," while Sarbanes-Oxley does not contain such a n express
limitation.297
A prominent whistleblower advocate made a similar argument
for a broad reading of "covered employer" to include non-publicly
traded corporations that have a contractual or agency relationship
with publicly traded corporations. Stephen Kohn of the National
Whistleblower Center asserted that this interpretation "is consis291. See Goodman v. Decisive Analytics Corp., 2006-SOX-11,
at 9-10(ALJ Jan. 10,2006);
Minkina v. Affiliated Physician's Group, 2005-SOX-19,
at 6 (ALJ Feb. 22,2005);Roulett v.
Am.Capital Access, 2004-SOX-78,
at 9 (ALJDec. 22,2004).
292. See cases cited id.
293. See id.
294. See id.
295. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 9.
296. See id.
297. See id.
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tent with the case law developed under other whistleblower laws."298
Specifically, under the Energy Reorganization Act, ALJs found
suppliers and vendors of formally covered companies to be covered
employers.299
A broader interpretation also furthers Sarbanes-Oxley's policy
goals. Professor Vaughn astutely noted that a n employee of a
contractor can be "well placed to discover fraud and abuse by the
[public] company" and public companies should not be able to
pressure contractors, subcontractors, or agents to "retaliate against
this employee."300Although Sarbanes-Oxley's administrative decision makers have not interpreted the Act in this manner, a reasonable interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley's language is that Congress
wanted to protect employees of these contractors, subcontractors,
and agents, given the role of such employees in "enabling or condoning corruption and fraud."301 Accordingly, Congress should
amend the Act to clarify that employees of companies that have
contractual relationships with publicly traded companies are also
protected a s whistleblowers when they report activities related to
fraud a t publicly traded companies.
2. Clarifying the Scope of "Protected Activity"
The Act's coverage of "protected activities" also could be broadly
construed. The statutes that the Act identifies a s proper subjects
for whistleblower disclosures cover a particularly broad swath of
activities. The criminal code provisions identified by Sarbanes-Oxley
a s topics for protected whistleblower disclosures "include some of
the broadest and most widely used provisions of the federal criminal
law."302The protection of disclosure related to conduct that violates
"any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission
... may permit the coverage of some disclosures not clearly encompassed by a purely economic definition of materiality under the

298. KOHN ET AL., supra note 8, at 70.
299. Id. at 70 n.3 (citing In re Five Star Prods., Inc., 38 N.R.C. 169,179-80 (1993)).
300. Vaughn, supra note 8, at 10.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 22 (citing 18 U.S.C. $ 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. I1 2002), which refers to sections 1341,
1343, 1344 and 1348 of Title 18 of the United States Code).
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securities laws."303Furthermore, by protecting "any" law "relating
to" fraud against shareholders, the Act protects disclosures about
not only securities laws, but also "any other federal law that relates
to the ability of shareholders to protect themselves against fraud,
such a s the Foreign Corrupt Practices
In other words, a s
Professor Vaughn argues, whistleblower disclosures about matters
"well beyond accounting f r a u d should be protected,306including:
disclosures of misconduct as diverse as health and safety
violations, the suppression of information regarding product
risks, environmental misconduct, consumer fraud, false claims
against the government, disregard of statutes requiring the
disclosure of information to federal regulatory agencies, violations of federal anti-discrimination laws, violations of statutes
and rules protective of labor, conspiracies to break the antitrust
laws, [and] bribery of public officials, including foreign officials,
and human rights abuses.306
Recent ARB decisions, however, rejected a broad interpretation
a n d reinforced the U s ' narrow readings of "protected activity,"
thus likely making the road steeper for future whistle blower^.^^^
First, the ARB required a whistleblower's disclosure to "definitely
and specifically" relate to the listed categories of fraud or securities
violations under 18U.S.C. 5 1514A(a)(l).~~~
In Platone v. FLYi,Inc.,
the ARB interpreted the Act to mean that whistleblower disclosures
regarding mail or wire fraud were insufficient, by themselves, to
constitute "protected activity"; rather, the ARB read into the Act a
requirement that the fraudulent conduct reported also specifically
had to 'be of a type that would be adverse to investors' interests."309
This additional requirement does not appear in the Act's statutory
303. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. I1 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
304. See id. a t 23.
305. See id. a t 46.
306. See id. a t 23.
307. I t should be noted that, a s of July 15,2007, the ARB has reversed the ALJ in all three
cases it has reviewed in which the employee won a t the ALJ level. See Welch v. Cardinal
Bankshares Corp., No. 05-065, a t 2 (ARB May 31,2007); Platone v. FLYi, Inc., No. 04-154, a t
2 (ARB Sept. 29, 2006); Getman v. Sw. Sec. Inc., No. 04-059, a t 1(ARB July 29,2005).
308. See Platone, No. 04-154, a t 17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
309. Id. a t 15.
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language, which seems to protect the disclosure of any mail or wire
fraud, not just fraud related to shareholders.310In fact, the ARB's
position directly contradicts the holding of a t least one federal court
" least one
that did not impose this additional r e q ~ i r e m e n t . ~At
subsequent ALJ opinion has sided with the ARB's narrow reading
of the "protected activity" requirement.312
Second, in a different case, the ARB specifically found that a
"mere possibility that a challenged practice could adversely affect
the financial condition of a corporation, and that the effect on the
financial condition could in turn be intentionally withheld from
investors, is not enough" to satisfy the "protected activity" requirement.313The ARB also seemed to require, a t the time a whistleblower makes a disclosure, that the whistleblower specifically identify
the statute violated by the activities the whistleblower reports and
connect the statute to Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions.314 Yet, the
assumption that rank-and-file employees would have such specific
and detailed legal knowledge is unwarranted.
Third, the ARB limited the Act's "protected activity" requirement
by qualifying Sarbanes-Oxley's mandate that the employee whistleblower "reasonably believe" that the corporate activity disclosed
violated one of the named statutes. In Allen v. Stewart Enterprises,
the ARB indicated that a "reasonable belief' that a statute has
been violated meant a high certainty that the law had been
broken.315In that case, the employee alleged that she examined
"internal consolidated financial statements" and that these statements indicated that the company violated a n SEC rule.316 The
ARB, however, found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule
violation was not protected because these internal reports did not
have to be filed with the SEC, and therefore could not have violated
310. See 18 U.S.C. 9 1514A(a)(l) (Supp. IV 2004).
311. See Reyna v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:04-cv-39(CDL), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42112,
a t *46-53 (M.D. Ga. June 11,2007).
312. See Deremer v. Gulfmark Offshore, Inc., 2006-SOX-2, a t 48-49 (AUJune 29,2007).
313. Harvey v. Home Depot, No. 04-114, a t 15 (ARB June 2,2006); see also Platone, No. 04154, a t 22 (finding that a reasonable shareholder would not find the potential loss of $1500
to be "material," and therefore holding that a whistleblower who reported such a loss would
not be protected under the Act).
314. See Allen v. Stewart Enters., No. 06-081, a t 12 (ARB July 27, 2006); Reddy v.
MedQuist, No. 04-123, a t 8-9 (ARB Sept. 30, 2005).
315. See Allen, No. 06-081, a t 14.
316. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the rule.317Accordingly, the ARB found that the employee could not
have "reasonably believe[dI7'that a violation of the rule occurred.318
By so doing, the ARB appears to have transformed the "reasonable
belief' standard into a n "actually violated standard, which contradicts the language and intent of the
Fourth, in Getman v. Southwest Securities, the ARB determined
that refusing to engage in illegal activity is not protected activity
under the
I n July 2005, the ARB reversed a n AU decision in
favor of a n employee who alleged that she refused to engage in a n
illegal activity-hanging
a stock rating.321The ARB found that
merely refusing to break the law, rather than affirmatively
reporting violations of the law to a person with supervisory
authority, cannot be deemed true whistleblowing protected by the
Although the ARB acknowledged that "there may be times
where only refusal is sufficient to provide information," and thus
would be protected activity, the facts in the case before it did not
satisfy that requirement.323Accordingly, employees who refuse to
engage in illegal activity must also demonstrate that their refusal
communicates to a person with supervisory authority that the
employer's conduct violates the law.324
This decision undermines a long tradition of interpreting both
statutory whistleblower protections and the common law of
wrongful discharge to protect a n employee who refuses to engage i n

317. See id.
318. See id.
319. A recent ARB case affirms that employees will have a difficult time meeting this
standard. I n Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Gorp., No. 05-064(ARB May 31,2007), the ARB
found that a chief financial officer was not protected by SOX when he reported accounting
errors that led his employer to overstate its earnings and complained that the company had
insufficient internal controls. See id. a t 9-14.Despite an AW finding in favor of the CFO that
these reports disclosed violations of federal securities laws, the ARB determined that the CFO
could not reasonably believe the company violated any laws. See id. a t 10-14.The CFO's
disclosure of the company's violation of generally accepted accounting standards was not
s a i c i e n t for Sarbanes-Oxley to protect the CFO. Rather, the ARB required the CFO to know
whether such accounting errors violated the intricacies of federal securities laws and
presumably to stay silent if the errors were not technically illegal. See id. a t 11-14.
320. No. 04-059,a t 10 (ARB July 29,2005).
321. See id. a t 9-10.
322. See id.
323. See id. a t 10.
324. See id.
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illegal activity.325The impact of this decision on employees may
be significant. I n the study, a substantial number of successful
employees alleged that Sarbanes-Oxley protected their refusal to
engage in illegal activity. Among all employees, only 8.7% (401462)
made this claim.326However, considerably more of the successful
employees made this claim in addition to claiming that they actually
provided information about illegal activity to another person: 60.0%
at the AU Level, and 30.8% a t the OSHA
The ARB'S
decision in Getman dismantles this avenue of protected whistleblowing.
Congress should legislatively reject these ARB holdings limiting
the breadth of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections. Specifically, Congress
should amend the Act's language to reject any requirement that
whistleblower disclosures must specifically relate to securities
fraud a s opposed to fraud in general, as defined by the statutory
references in the Act. Additionally, to address the ARB holdings
regarding the legal specificity of a whistleblower disclosure,
Congress should amend the Act to emphasize that a n employee's
reasonable belief regarding the illegality of a n activity reported
should be compared with a n employee of similar education and
experience. Finally, the Act should more clearly protect a n employee's refusal to engage in illegal activity by incorporating specific
language to that effect in the statutory provisions.
3. Clarifying the Decision-Making Process

In addition to clarifying the Act's substantive protections,
Congress also could require OSHA and the OALJ to provide
employees more information on the Act's protections and conse325. See, e.g., Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 255 (1987) (interpreting the
Surface Transportation Assistance Act to protect an employee who refused to operate a motor
vehicle that did not comply with safety regulations); Tameny v. Atl. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d
1330, 1330-31 (Cal. 1980) (protecting refusal to participate in illegal price furing scheme);
Petermann v. I n t l Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396,344 P.2d 25,26-28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(protecting refusal to commit perjury); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270,275-76 (W.
Va. 1978) (protecting refusal to violate a consumer credit code).
326. Forty out of 462 complainants whose allegations were discernable claimed to have
refused to engage in illegal activity (8.7%). See Moberly, Basic Data, supra note 135, a t tb1.K.
327. Three out of five successful ALJ complainants (60%) and four out of 13 successful
OSHA complainants (30.8%) made this claim. See id.
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quences prior to blowing the whistle. The low employee success rate
revealed i n this study suggests that whistleblowers and their
attorneys need more information about their chance of success i n
the administrative process. Statistical data would provide whistleblowers better information with which to weigh the costs and
benefits of blowing the whistle in the first place.
Currently, OSHA and the OAW maintain and publish information related to Sarbanes-Oxley complaints under surprisingly
different standards and policies. OSHA maintains statistics about
the outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints and is willing to release
them, but only i n response to a specific request.328By contrast, the
OALJ stopped keeping and releasing statistics regarding the
outcomes of Sarbanes-Oxley cases in April 2005.329However, the
OALJ publishes all ALJ decisions on its website and provides a
helpful digest of decisions organized by
OSHA, on the other
hand, requires a FOIA request to release individual decision letters
and does not publish any summary or digest of its decisions.331
Neither OSHA nor the OALJ has agreed to release complete
information regarding settlements.332
For broadest exposure, all information regarding both overall
statistics and individualized decisions from OSHA and the ALJs
should be published. Such information could appear on the OSHA
and OALJ websites, including running totals of the amounts
awarded to employees and amounts received by employees through
settlements, in addition to basic information such as the win rate for
employees. As a point of comparison, the EEOC, the other major
federal administrative agency that processes and adjudicates
employee claims, provides similar statistics on its website, demarcated by year and statute.333
328. See E-mail from Nilgun Tolek, Dir., OSHA Office of Investigative Assistance, to author
(Oct. 5, 2006) (on file with author).
329. See E-mail from Todd Smyth, Office of Administrative Law Judges, to author (Feb. 15,
2006) (on fde with author).
330. See U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, OFFICEOFADMIN.LAWJUDGES,SARBANES-OXLN
ACT (SOX)
WHISTLEBLOWERDIGEST, http:/lwww.oalj.dol.govlPUBLIClWHISTLEBLOWERl
REFERENCESt'REFERENCE-WORKSISOX-DIGEST.HTh4(last visited Sept. 22,2007).
331. See OSHA, supra note 250,s 1I.C.
332. See Letter from Richard E. Fairfax, Dir. of the Directorate of Enforcement Programs,
OSHA, to author (Nov. 6,2006) (on file with author); Letter from John M. Vittone, Chief ALJ,
and Andrea Thomas, FOIA Coordinator, to author (Feb. 12,2007) (on file with author).
333. See EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, http:llwww.eeoc.govlstats/
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If OSHA and the ALJs made these statistics readily available for
Sarbanes-Oxley cases, the statistics could dispel the popular (and
possibly administrative) opinion that the Act is overly protective of
employees. To the extent that administrative decision makers view
Sarbanes-Oxley cases with skepticism because of the Act's potentially dramatic applicability to millions of employees, these decision
makers may have a tendency to read the Act narrowly in order to
avoid a "flood" of litigants. Statistical information about the
overwhelming advantage employers have in the Sarbanes-Oxley
claims process may have a substantive impact on decision makers,
who may reevaluate such inclinations. Additionally, this public
exposure may also limit any decision maker bias toward a particular
party.
With regard to substantive, a s opposed to statistical, information,
OSHA could follow the OALJ's lead and post its decision letters
online for public inspection. OSHA could also update and publish
any guidance it gives to its field investigators regarding OSHA's
approach to the unique Sarbanes-Oxley issues addressed in this
Article, such a s OSHA's interpretation of the "covered employeryy
and "protected activity" requirements. Other agencies make similar
information publicly available; for example, the EEOC publishes a
detailed Compliance Manual and updated Enforcement Guidances
describing the standards used by the EEOC when evaluating
various legal issues.334Such information would allow for further
public discourse and transparency regarding OSHA's interpretations of these debatable issues.
These suggestions would impose little administrative cost on the
government, given that OSHA and the OALJ already maintain
much of the information. Moreover, this information may convince
employees with marginal claims not to assert them. Weak claims
may have led to stronger than necessary language in decisions
construing the Act narrowly.335This narrowing language is problematic because of its applicability to later cases in which a broader
enforcement.htm1(last visited Sept. 22,2007).
334. See EEOC, Compliance Manual, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/compliance.html(last
visited Sept. 22,2007); EEOC, Enforcement Guidances and Related Documents, http://www.
eeoc.gov/policy/guidance.html(last visited Sept. 22,2007).
335. Cf. Selmi, supra note 264, at 567-68 (discussing this problem in the context of the
ADA).
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interpretation might have been appropriate. A stronger overall pool
of employee-complainants may help convince decision makers that
a slightly broader view of the Act is appropriate to satisfy SarbanesOxley's remedial aims with only a minimal risk of opening the
floodgates for frivolous claims.

C. Enforcing the Burden of Proof
Unlike the unclear scope of some of Sarbanes-Oxley's legal
boundaries, Sarbanes-Oxleymandates a n unambiguously employeefriendly burden of proof for claims that fall within the Act's
protections. As discussed above, employees have a low burden
because the employee must only prove causation under a "contributing factoryytest.336Conversely, Sarbanes-Oxley places a high burden
on employers, who must prove their rebuttal under a "clear and
convincing" standard.337~ h u s a, reasonable expectation when the
case focuses on a causation dispute would be that, absent significant
case selection effects, Sarbanes-Oxley should produce a higher than
average win rate for employees. Indeed, ALJ decisions met this
expectation, a s employees won 66.7% of the time when "causation"
was the issue, and 88.3% of the time when the employer was
required to satisfy the "clear and convincing" burden of proof.338
But, despite having every advantage regarding the burden of
proof for causation, employees still lost a t a n extremely high rate a t
the OSHA Level, even when the only issue was causation. OSHA
found that a n employee satisfied the "contributing factory'standard
only 30.6% of the time.339When the employee met this level of proof,
placing a "clear and convincing" burden of proof on the employer
still resulted in a relatively low employee win rate of 35.1%.~~'
Overall in these "causation" cases, employees won only 10.7%of the
time a t the OSHA Level, compared to 55.6% of the time a t the ALJ

336. See discussion supra Part I.B.
337. See id.
338. See Tables 9 and 10 supra.
339. See Table 9 supra.
340. See Table 10 supra.
341. See Table 8 supra.
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This problem presents no easy solution. The statutory language
already sets forth the favorable burden of proof for employees
unambiguously, so further legislative change to the burden of
proof seems unhelpful. OSHA itself appears unable or unwilling to
implement Sarbanes-Oxley's employee-friendly burdens.
To the extent OSHA is willing but unable to perform this task,
Congress should provide OSHA with more resources to investigate
and to adjudicate Sarbanes-Oxley claims adequately. A fuller
investigation and more information from employees may increase
the likelihood of employee success a t the OSHA Level. To provide a
fuller investigation-one that is more "hearing-like"-Congress
should provide OSHA subpoena power i n its Sarbanes-Oxley
investigations, similar to the authority OSHA employs to enforce
the Occupational Safety and Health
Additionally, OSHA
should amend its regulations to provide itself more authority for
information gathering.343Altering OSHA's policies and regulations
to ensure more employee participation in the process may present
OSHA with more complete information about the factual circumstances of a case.344
For example, the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), which
protects federal government employees who report waste, mismanagement, or wrongdoing, takes a different approach than the
current OSHA regulations. When the Office of Special Counsel
investigates a whistleblower's complaint against a federal agency,
the WPA permits the whistleblower to comment upon the agency's
answer to the whistleblower's complaint after it is submitted to

342. See 29 U.S.C. § 657(b) (2000) (granting OSHA subpoena power when OSHA
investigates possible safety and health problems).
343. As part of this overhaul, OSHA should also highlight Sarbanes-Oxley's unique burden
of proof structure in its investigative manual and better differentiate Sarbanes-Oxley from
other whistleblower statutes OSHA administers.
344. See Robert G. Vaughn et al., The Whistleblower Statute Prepared for the Organization
ofAmerican States a n d the Global Legal Revolution Protecting Whistleblowers, 35 GEO.WASH.
INTL L. REV. 857, 864 (2003) (asserting that a model whistleblower law should include
provisions enabling whistleblowers to be "involved in the administrative process regarding
evaluation of their allegations and regarding petitions for protection or redress," including
being given opportunities "to respond or to provide additional information"); see also Valerie
J. Watnick, WhistleblowerProtections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Primer a n d a Critique
60 (Oct. 3, 2006) (Express0 Preprint Series, Working Paper No. 1822), available a t
http:/llaw.bepress.com/expresso/epsll822.
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This statutorily mandated back-and-forth
the Special
exchange provides the Special Counsel with a more complete picture
of the factual background to the case. Similarly, a broader picture
may give OSHA's investigators the proper context with which to
apply the appropriate employee-friendly burden of proof.346In fact,
in April 2006, OSHA amended its procedures to require that a n
employee receive "at least the substance" of the employer's response
to a Sarbanes-Oxley complaint.347Additionally, other evidence from
the employer, or a t least the "substance" of such evidence, ''may"
also be disclosed to the employee.348Although these changes are a n
improvement, OSHA still fails to require that the employee receive
the employer's actual response and other evidence presented by the
employer, and also fails to unambiguously permit the employee to
comment upon and respond to the employer's submissions. Without
such full disclosure and opportunity to participate, the employee
will have a difficult time fully presenting a case of retaliation and
responding to the employer's version of the events.
To the extent OSHA's failure is one of will, merely increasing
OSHA's authority and resources may not be sufficiently drastic to
respond to the agency's failure to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley adequately. Rather, it may be necessary to remove OSHA entirely from
this role. In fact, from the Act's inception, OSHA seemed like a n
unlikely choice to investigate corporate whistleblower claims.349
Although the agency administers thirteen other whistleblower
provisions, the type of corporate fraud a t issue in Sarbanes-Oxley
cases seems far removed from the worker safety and health issues
addressed by many of the other statutes under OSHA's purview.350
At least three other options may serve the Act's, and whistleblow345. See 5 U.S.C. $ 1213(e)(l) (2000).
346. Cf.Vaughn et al., supra note 344, a t 864 (noting that involvement of whistleblowers
in the administrative process "not only reassures whistleblowers but also increases the
efficiency of the administrative process").
347. See OSHA, supra note 250.
348. See id.
349. See Cherry, supra note 8, a t 1083 n.383; Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbanes-Oxley After Three
Years, 2005 N.Z.L. REV.365,371 (noting that "Congress delegated enforcement [of SarbanesOxley] to safety and health regulators unsophisticated in financial fraud rather than to
securities regulators"); Solomon, supra note 243.
350. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c) (2000);
Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. $ 31105 (2000); see also Solomon,
supra note 243 (noting that OSHA had to hand out books on securities laws to investigators).
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ers', interests better than keeping investigative responsibility with
OSHA.
Two of these options entail providing more formalized hearing
procedures to whistleblowers in the first instance, without requiring
employees to jump through the hoops of a n administrative investigation. First, Congress could eliminate the statutory 180-day
waiting period before a whistleblower can file a claim in federal
court. Indeed, a n early draft of Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower
protections did not contain this waiting period and permitted
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers to file directly in federal
At
least one other anti-retaliation provision that protects "financial"
whistleblowers-specifically, employees of depository institutions
and federal banks who report illegal conduct-permits direct filing
of anti-retaliation claims in federal
Federal courts may be
more willing and able to apply Sarbanes-Oxley's shifting burdens of
proof correctly.353If so, then removing the 180-day waiting period
would enable whistleblowers to avoid OSHA's procedural unfairness
and choose the federal forum immediately.
Second, if direct filing in federal court overly burdens a n alreadycrowded federal docket, employees could be permitted to bypass
the OSHA investigation and obtain a n ALJ hearing directly. ALJs
currently review Sarbanes-Oxley cases de novo after a n OSHA
investigation and without deference to OSHA's determination^.^^^
To the extent OSHA currently filters cases with little or no merit,
ALJs could perform this same function with orders to show cause,
motions to dismiss, and motions for summary judgment. Indeed, the
study demonstrates that AUs regularly decided cases based on prehearing legal arguments regarding the applicability of SarbanesOxley to a n employee's claims.355The advantage of sending cases
351. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at'22.26 (2002). The waiting period was added a s part of a
compromise with the same group of Republican senators that reduced the statute of
limitations from 180 days to 90 days. See supm notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
352. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,12 U.S.C.
$ 1831j (2000).
353. To determine the accuracy of this speculation, I am currently collecting and analyzing
Sarbanes-Oxley cases filed in federal courts.
354. See 29 C.F.R. $ 1980.107(b) (2006).
355. The study found that ALJs decided 67 of 93 cases (72%)without a factual hearing,
based primarily on motion practice. A complete table setting forth the results regarding the
resolution of ALJ cases by hearing or motion can be found a t Moberly, Basic Data, supra note
135, a t tb1.L.
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directly to the OALJ would be that, when the facts are in dispute,
ALJs have demonstrated the ability and willingness to apply the
burdens of proof in the employee-friendly manner in which Congress
intended.356
Finally, to the extent a n initial administrative investigation has
value, shifting initial investigative responsibility to a different
administrative agency represents a third option. One possible
alternative investigatory body is the SEC. A whistleblower investigation by the SEC, with its ongoing concern for corporate fraud, may
better deter corporate fraud than the threat of any other agency
investigation. Through Sarbanes-Oxley investigations, the SEC may
learn information that could lead to charges of securities fraud
against companies or individual officers, which would have much
greater deterrence value than the typical whistleblower investigation of a n employee complaint. In fact, any violation of SarbanesOxley, presumably including the Act's whistleblower provision,
already should be considered a violation of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, with penalties of up to $1million in fines and ten years
in prison.357Although not currently enforced in this manner, placing
the SEC in charge of whistleblower investigations might encourage
the agency to request that the Department of Justice utilize this
additional enforcement mechanism to deter retaliation against
whistleblowers. In short, the SEC seems like a natural choice to
investigate claims related to shareholder fraud.
However, this suggestion presents the risk that the SEC may be
just as unsympathetic to whistleblowers a s OSHA. Since the Act's
inception, the SEC has shown little or no interest in whistleblower
claims. Even though the SEC receives summaries of whistleblower
allegations filed with OSHA,358the SEC has not publicly recommended that the Department of Justice investigate any person
356. I t must be remembered, however, that only nine cases made it to the "causation" stage
of an ALJ's decision-making process. Thus, if this suggestion were adopted, then it would be
important to address the U s ' fmation on the Act's procedural and legal boundaries, as
discussed in the prior two sub-Parts. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-B.
357. See Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002,s 3(b), 156 U.S.C. $ 7202(b) (Supp. IV 2004) (stating
that "a violation by any person of th[e Sarbanes-Oxley] Act ...shall be treated for all purposes
in the same manner as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ... and any such
person shall be subject to the same penalties, and to the same extent, as for a violation of that
Act"); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2000).
358. See 29 C.F.R. 1980.104(a) (2006).
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accused of retaliating against a whistleblower. I n 2004, two U.S.
Senators formally requested that the SEC explain whether the SEC
intended to use its authority to file civil enforcement actions for
violations of Sarbanes-Oxley in order to enforce Sarbanes-Oxley's
anti-retaliation provisions.359The Chairman of the SEC responded
that the SEC puts its resources toward "substantive" violations of
securities laws and therefore would leave Sarbanes-Oxley antiretaliation enforcement to the Department of Labor.360Yet, despite
this apparent reluctance to become involved with whistleblower
claims, a formal congressional mandate for the SEC to enforce
Sarbanes-Oxley's whistleblower provisions may motivate the
agency, particularly if whistleblower investigations unveil "substantive" violations of other securities laws.
Any of these options could provide better protection for employees
than maintaining the status quo, which likely fails to deter retaliation against whistleblowers adequately.

D. Thinking About Broader Protections
Rigid and narrow interpretations of the Act seem inappropriate
given the Act's remedial goals and the necessity of employee
whistleblowers to reveal corporate fraud.361For some whistleblower
advocates, a "model" whistleblower statute--one that maximizes
encouragement and protection of whistleblowers-should protect a
broad range of whistleblowers and disclosures.362Despite the great
expectations that existed a t the time of the Act's passage, the
current interpretations of Sarbanes-Oxley do not attain these goals
because they narrow the scope of protected disclosures and, by
strictly construing the type of employee covered by the Act, seem to
focus inordinately on the whistleblower rather than the disclosure
being made.363Accordingly, the results of this study raise a question
359. See Letter from Patrick Leahy and Charles E. Grassley, Senators, to William H.
Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1(Nov. 9, 2004) (on file with author).
360. See Letter from William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n to Patrick
Leahy and Charles E. Grassley, Senators, a t 3-4 (Dec. 21,2004) (on file with author).
361. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 1, a t 1116-17 (discussing the importance
of employees as corporate monitors).
362. See Vaughn et al., supra note 344, a t 865 (discussing various provisions of a "modeln
whistleblower statute).
363. See id. a t 864 (asserting that a model whistleblower statute should focus on the
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that deserves further research: should Congress explicitly protect
corporate whistleblowers more broadly? Specifically, the strict linedrawing problems revealed by the study may indicate that a
broader, more general whistleblower act may be necessary in order
to fully protect and encourage whistleblowers. At least two alternative types of statutory protections deserve further consideration.
First, drawing technical distinctions between publicly traded and
privately held companies in both the subsidiary and contractor
scenarios likely creates employee confusion regarding whether a
potential whistleblower will be protected from retaliation. This
confusion can only lead to inconsistent enforcement of the Act and
therefore less whistleblower disclosure. At its most dangerous, such
distinctions provide a free pass for privately held corporations to
retaliate against any employee who reports internal misconduct.
Thus, Congress could reconsider whether employee protections
should hinge on the vagaries of the corporate decision to publicly
trade its shares. A more commonly utilized distinction in employment law is for statutes to cover employers with a definable number
of employees, such a s Title VII's 15-employee minimum.364Indeed,
Sarbanes-Oxley could achieve similar coverage with less ambiguous
language by relying on the number of employees a s a proxy for
publicly traded companies. In order to avoid overly burdening
employers, Congress could set the number of employees required for
coverage a t the same minimum set by the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which provides the largest minimum of any federal
employment statute: the FMLA covers employers with fifty or more
employees within a seventy-five mile radius of a work site.365This
requirement would be both over- and underinclusive, in that it
would exclude small publicly traded companies yet include large
privately held companies. However, it would provide more certainty
disclosure made by the whistleblower, not the whistleblower himself).
364. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Q 701(b), 42 U.S.C. Q 2000e(b) (2000) (15
employees); see also Americans with Disabilities Act 5 101,42 U.S.C. Q 12111(5)(A)(2000) (15
employees); Age Discrimination in Employment Act Q ll(b), 29 U.S.C. Q 630(b) (2000) (20
employees). I t should be noted that several whistleblower protections do not require a
minimum number of employees. Instead, these statutory anti-retaliation provisions protect
employees from retaliation by any "person," including employers of any size. See, e.g.,
Occupational Safety and Health Act Q ll(c), 29 U.S.C. Q 660(c) (2000).
365. See 29 U.S.C. Q 2611(2) (2000) (defining eligible employees); id. Q 2611(4) (defining
covered employers).
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regarding coverage because employees may better understand this
criteria commonly utilized by other employee protection statutes.
Second, the type of disclosure that will be protected likely
provides another area of confusion for employees, employers, and
decision makers. Sarbanes-Oxley follows the general federal model
of using statutory whistleblower protections to protect only certain
disclosures related to the substantive aims of a particular statute.366
This federal model will always depend upon difficult line drawing
a s long a s the aim of whistleblower protection is to encourage only
whistleblower disclosures regarding specific topics, such a s fraud or
workplace safety. By tying the protection a n employee receives to
whether the employee disclosed information about a "protected"
topic, federal law puts enormous consequences on the ability of a n
employee to frame a whistleblower disclosure in the terms presented by a specific statute. It also presents a n easy target for
employers or administrative decision makers to limit a law's
coverage by forcing employees to make a n unreasonably specific
whistleblowing disclosure or to hold a n unrealistic understanding
of the law. Sarbanes-Oxley's language is particularly problematic
because of the broad applicability of the statute across industries a s
compared to other whistleblower provisions that are aimed a t
specific industries.367Additionally, the Act's goal of preventing
"shareholder f r a u d appears more ambiguous and open-ended than
other topics, such as workplace health and safety.368Furthermore,
Sarbanes-Oxley's broad language implies that Congress prefers
protection for disclosure of a broader range of misconduct, but the
overall aim of the Act is to prevent shareholder fraud, a point that
the ARB has used to limit the type of activities the Act protects.369
Avoiding these line-drawing problems with broader protections
may be appropriate. California's and New Jersey's whistleblower
366. Sarbanes-Oxley s p e ~ ~ c a l aims
l y a t disclosures related to corporate fraud. Other
examples of such limited federal protection include the Energy Reorganization Act, aimed a t
disclosures related to nuclear safety, see 42 U.S.C. $ 5851 (2000); the Occupational Safety and
Health Act, aimed a t disclosures related to workplace safety and health, see 29 U.S.C. 5 660(c)
(2000); and AIR21, geared toward protecting whistleblowers who report problems with airline
safety, 49 U.S.C. $ 42121 (2000).
367. See, e.g., Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. 5 5851 (2000) (aimed a t the nuclear
power industry); AIR21,49 U.S.C. $42121 (2000) (aimed a t airline industry).
368. Cf. Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) $ 2(b), 29 U.S.C. $ 651(b) (2000).
369. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.
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protection statutes, for example, protect corporate whistleblowers
who report any illegal activity, such a s a violation of a statute, rule,
or regulation.370At the federal level, the National Whistleblower
Center proposed legislation that would broadly protect corporate
whistleblowers in the same manner.371 Internationally, model
statutes developed by whistleblower scholars in conjunction with
the Office of Legal Cooperation of the Organization of American
States contain similarly protective provisions,372a s do statutes
applicable to private sector employees in Great Britain,373Canada,374
and South
Given the difficulty employees have had
penetrating the boundaries of Sarbanes-Oxley's limited "protected
activity" requirement, these explicitly broad protections warrant
further consideration. Although any new definition will have gray
areas a t the edges, a n expansion and simplification of the "protected
activity" requirement could reduce the tendency among administrative decision makers to strictly construe whether a whistleblower
deserves protection based upon the type of disclosure made.
In sum, the study indicates that many employee losses resulted
from the focus of administrative decision makers on issues that
define the legal boundaries of the Act. To the extent one believes
that we should encourage substantial numbers of corporate
employee whistleblowers to report a wide range of misconduct, one
response to the study's results might be for Congress to provide
broader whistleblower protections to more clearly protect whistleblowers that Sarbanes-Oxley excludes--either through its statutory
language or because of the narrow construction of such language by
administrative agencies.
Of course, another view might be that Congress meant SarbanesOxley to address only the problem of corporate fraud in public
companies; in that case, the study's results demonstrate that
administrative decision makers have appropriately enforced the
370. See CAL.LAB. CODE3 1102.5 (Deering 2005); N.J. STAT.ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2006).
371. See National Whistleblower Protection Act proposal, http:llweb.archive.orglwebl
20060219004326lwww.whistleblowers.org~aw.htm
(last visited
Sept. 22, 2007); see also Cherry, supra note 8, at 1170 & n.287, 1121 (recommending the
proposal from the National Whistleblower Center).
372. See Vaughn et al., supra note 344, at 859, 865-66.
373. See id. at 891-92 (discussing the Public Interest Disclosure Act of 1998).
374. See id. at 882 (discussing the New Brunswick Employment Standards Act).
375. See id. at 893-94 (discussing the South African Public Disclosures Act).
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narrow legal parameters of the Act. Suggestions to broaden
whistleblower protections inevitably lead to counterarguments that
these protections extend Sarbanes-Oxley beyond its original focus
on corporate fraud and that any restriction on a n employer's ability
to fire a n employee will result in higher employer costs.376In turn,
these higher employer costs could force lower employee wages or
higher unemployment. Neither outcome would help employees as a
Further research should examine whether the benefits of
broader whistleblower protection would outweigh these inevitable
costs.

This study suggests that Sarbanes-Oxley fails to protect employee
whistleblowers a s Congress originally intended. The unfulfilled
expectations of employees regarding the Act's potential protections
have led to a surprisingly low win rate in claims adjudicated
administratively under the Act. In particular, two discrepancies
between employee expectation and administrative implementation
contributed to the low win rate for employees throughout SarbanesOxley's administrative process.
First, OSHA and the U s typically found for the employer
because the employee failed to satisfy the Act's legal hurdles.
During the initial years of the Act's implementation, employees may
have brought claims that pushed the boundaries of the Act.
Administrative decision makers responded by narrowly interpreting
the Act's provisions, particularly with regard to the procedural bar
of the statute of limitations and the boundary requirements of a
prima facie case, including the "covered employer" and "protected
activity" elements. Because most Sarbanes-Oxley cases were
resolved through the resolution of legal issues, the causation issues
surrounding a whistleblower's allegation were rarely adjudicated.
Second, in instances when the more factual allegations of
causation were addressed, OSHA tended to apply the Act's
employee-friendly burden of proof inappropriately. In these cases,
376. See generally Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB.L. REV.101 (1988).
377. See id.
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OSHA consistently found for the employer, even when the only issue
was whether the employer satisfied a "clear and convincing" burden
of proof.
To address these issues, Congress could make several changes to
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. To redress the unfair burdens the Act's
short statute of limitations imposes on employees, Congress could
lengthen the limitations period from 90 to a t least 180 days, which
would comport with statutes of limitations found in other employment laws.
Additionally, to curb the rigid application of the Act's '%boundaries," Congress could consider clarifying the Act's coverage for
areas on which OSHA and the U s appear to focus: the "covered
employer" requirement and the "protected activity" requirement.
Clarifying the scope of the Act's coverage would protect employees
who report wrongdoing, but work for a type of company or report a
type of misconduct that administrative decision makers currently
determine to be outside of Sarbanes-Oxley's protections. Congress
also could require that OSHA and the U s publicize and report the
types of findings they make in order to better inform the public of
the limitations of their decision making.
Finally, to address OSHA's apparent misapplication of the Act's
burden of proof, Congress and OSHA could provide employees more
influence and participation in the investigative process, enabling
OSHA to consider both sides of the dispute more fully. To supplement this suggestion, Congress should provide OSHA more
resources to enable the agency to comprehensively and competently
administer the increased load of Sarbanes-Oxley cases. Alternatively, Congress could consider removing OSHA a s the primary
investigator of Sarbanes-Oxley complaints. Other options are
available: Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers could file directly in
federal court or with a n AW;or, another agency such a s the SEC
might be able to apply the statute more appropriately.
Recent corporate scandals powerfully reinforced the notion that
employees are uniquely positioned to identlfy and to report corporate misconduct.378Employees' internal placement in the corporate
structure often provides them with better information about
wrongdoing than external corporate monitors, such a s the govern378. See Moberly, Structural Model, supra note 1, at 1116-25.
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ment or outside attorneys and accountant^.^'^ This monitoring can
only be effective, however, if the law protects whistleblowers from
retaliation. Employees will report wrongdoing less frequently unless
they are given credible assurances that they will be safe from
retaliation. Unfortunately, during the first years of its existence,
Sarbanes-Oxley has not sufficiently protected whistleblowers and
thus cannot provide such assurances. As a result, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires further congressional and administrative scrutiny in order
to fulfill Congress's and employees' expectations that employees will
be protected from retaliation for blowing the whistle on corporate
malfeasance.

379. See id.at 1116-17.

